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INTRODUCTION 
Starting from 2002 there appeared studies that were claiming that value of the companies 
is generated not only by tangible assets that are in the company, but also there is something else 
that generates value (Fuller, 2012). One of the possible sources is considered to be intellectual 
capital, and when intellectual capital is mentioned, it is attributed not only to the employees, but 
also to the stakeholders who might participate in the life of the company but not be necessarily 
involved as an employee. 
When identifying possible sources of the intellectual capital, scholars refer to board of 
directors which is considered to be one of the most important internal mechanisms of corporate 
governance. Because of the importance of the board of directors and of its roles and functions, it 
is believed that board of directors’ composition and intellectual capital have an impact on company 
performance (Markarian, Parbonetti, 2007). Speaking about intellectual capital of board of 
directors, one can consider knowledge, experience, connections and network board members hold 
as constituents of their intellectual capital. Board busyness can be described as one of the 
characteristics that is describing intellectual capital (social capital), and average number of 
additional positions held by directors can be used as a measure to describe busyness. 
Busyness concept has different angles: on the one hand, it can be beneficial, on the other 
hand, it can bring harm. Positive aspects of the concept are concluded in reputation hypothesis, 
according to which busy directors obtain good reputation which implies that they are valuable 
assets for the company (Fama, Jensen, 1983), in quality hypothesis, according to which busy 
directors obtain great experience and broad knowledge in different aspects (Fama, 1980) and in 
resource dependence theory, according to which companies need the access to the resources to be 
prosperous (Pfeffer, 1972), and busy directors can provide with this access through their 
connections and network. However, on the other hand there is busyness hypothesis which simply 
states that busy directors do not have enough time to properly perform their duties in all the 
companies they are serving for (Ferris et al., 2003).  
Existing studies find evidence for both positive (Sarkar, Sarkar, 2009) and negative (Fich, 
Shivdasani, 2006) relationship between the busyness and company performance; some studies find 
evidence that there is no relationship (Arioglu, Kaya, 2015). After studying these cases, getting 
acquainted with different concepts connected to the board busyness, and noticing that there are 
almost no studies on the related topic in the Russian market, the following research question raise: 
is it beneficial for companies to have busy boards, in other words, is there relationship between 
board busyness and company performance for Russian companies?  
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The goal of this master thesis is to answer this question, and in order to reach the goal the 
following objectives are set:  
• to analyze the concept of intellectual capital of board of directors; 
• to examine the busyness concept as one of the components of social capital;  
• to review previous studies devoted to the relationship between board busyness and 
company performance; 
• to conduct empirical research on the relationship of board busyness and financial 
performance, and board busyness and level of agency costs in Russian public 
companies; 
• to analyze the results obtained and provide managerial implications. 
The thesis is organized in the following way: first chapter is devoted to description of the 
board of directors, its roles, functions and intellectual capital. Second chapter is more concentrated 
on the company performance and views it from two perspectives: as financial performance and 
through the level of agency costs. It is especially relevant to use agency costs to describe company 
performance in this case because of big role of board of directors in managing agency costs. Third 
chapter contains the empirical study and analysis of the obtained results with their possible 
managerial implications.  
The empirical study examines if there is relationship between board busyness and firm 
financial performance (measured with the use of both accounting-based and market-based 
performance indicators) and also between board busyness and the level of agency costs. Study is 
conducted on the sample consisting of 219 Russian public companies and covering 2015-2016 
period. Moreover, speaking about the board busyness, in the study it is examined both busyness 
of outside and inside directors, and their relation to company performance. 
Obtained results suggest that there is negative relationship between board busyness and 
financial operating performance, non-linear relationship between busyness and market 
performance, and positive relationship between board busyness and the level of agency costs. 
These results allow to come up with recommendations for different groups of stakeholders, such 
as shareholders, investors, managers and regulatory authorities. 
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1. INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
First chapter is devoted to boards of directors that can be considered as one of the main 
internal corporate governance mechanisms. Intellectual capital of the board of directors will be 
discussed along with the examples of the studies that probe that boards of directors have an impact 
on the company performance. 
1.1. Board of directors as one of the main internal corporate governance mechanisms 
The concept of the corporate governance is not easy to define: there is no one single 
definition accepted by everyone and which covers all the aspects corporate governance includes. 
For example, the UK Cadbury Report (1992) states that corporate governance is “the system by 
which companies are directed and controlled”. Other reports or academic sources provide with 
broad definition of the corporate governance focusing on interrelationship between internal groups 
and individuals like the board of directors, managers, shareholders in general meeting and 
employees (Bagaric, Hargovan, Du Plessis, 2010). With the time evolving, the definition is also 
developing, and if to choose one specific definition, corporate governance can be explained as “the 
process of controlling management and of balancing the interests of all internal stakeholders and 
other parties who can be affected by the corporation’s conduct in order to ensure responsible 
behavior by corporations and to achieve the maximum level of efficiency and profitability for a 
corporation” (ibid.).  
As is mentioned above, corporate governance involves different stakeholders within the 
company and interactions between them. Three main players are usually considered to be 
management, shareholders and board of directors, and they form what is called “corporate 
governance triangle” (Ewmi, 2005). Three types of relationships in this triangle are dependent on 
mutual responsibilities and on the flows of information between them; in the end, it can be stated 
that not own responsibilities are crucial, but interactions between these three anchors are key to 
effective governance. For example, investors provide companies with the capital, while in return 
management is responsible for running the company well and delivering accurate financial reports 
and figures. 
Good corporate governance policies are supposed to be not only fancy words on paper, 
there is important role attributed to them; they play the role in accomplishing economic goals 
connected to investor confidence, allocation and formation of the capital. The idea is that there is 
connection between the corporate governance quality and the cost of corporations’ access to the 
capital for growth; besides, the quality affects the confidence of the providers of this capital (The 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 2004). 
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Many companies deciding on having board of directors themselves or establishing it 
because of specific law requirements, attribute different functions to it; however, at the same time, 
it is possible to encounter different opinions about what the board of directors is supposed to do. 
According to classic works on agency theory (Jensen, Meckling, 1976; Fama, Jensen, 1983), the 
functions of the board of directors include monitoring top-management and rewarding it. As board 
of directors is playing in a sense the “bridge” role between shareholders and top-management, 
monitoring top-management is necessary to ensure that actions of the executives correspond to the 
shareholders’ interests. In other words, board of directors and its actions are focused on the agency 
costs and are supposed to reduce them. Stewardship theory, being an addition, another angle of 
view at agency theory, or an alternative to it, focuses on the strategic importance of board of 
directors and its strategic function (Davis et al., 1997). Furthermore, some authors concentrate on 
resource dependence theory, according to which board of directors are seen as boundary spanners 
(Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer, Salancik, 1978). 
According to Zahra, Pearce (1989), there are at least four different perspectives on the roles 
of the board of directors: legalistic, resource dependence, class hegemony and agency theory. Each 
of these perspectives has different view on what directors should do and which characteristics of 
the board influence company performance. Consequently, different perspectives suggest different 
criteria based on which it is possible to assess board of directors’ contribution to the company 
performance. The first one, legalistic perspective focuses on legally prescribed directors’ duties; 
corporate law allows directors to fulfill their roles. Following this approach, main board’s role 
implies representing and also protecting shareholders’ interests without participating and 
interfering in everyday activities (Molz, 1988). 
The company is a so-called amalgam of both tangible and intangible assets plus 
capabilities, and as strategic resources can be classified those that are non-substitutable, rare, 
valuable and inimitable (Black, Boal, 1994). Within this approach to the resources, board of 
directors can be perceived as a strategic resource (Chambers et al., 2013).  Resource dependence 
perspective was already mentioned above with the specific function of the board; however, to add 
more here it is important to mention that in addition to the role of boundary spanners, boards also 
responsible for enhancing organizational legitimacy and extracting crucial for the companies’ 
resources. To perform these roles, boards are expected to keep an eye on the environment securing 
valuable resources and also acting on behalf of the company in the community (Zald, 1967). 
Class hegemony perspective derives from Marxist Sociology and states that board’s role 
implies perpetuation of the power and control of the elite, which results in such functions as 
directors recruitment and decrease of the transaction costs (Ratcliff, 1980). Moreover, board is 
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seen as a distinct partly autonomous network with power, being deeply set in the society and 
community (Stiles, Taylor, 2001). However, this perspective has at least three limitations: there is 
no profound description of specific ways how the board of directors can contribute to the company 
performance, overgeneralizations in terms of post hoc analyses takes place, and class hegemony 
perspective does not take into account the fact that the patterns of corporate ownership are 
changing (Zahra, Pearce, 1989).  
Finally, fourth perspective derives from the agency theory which also was already 
mentioned. From this perspective, agency relationships are the ones that should be analyzed and 
carefully studied in the corporate governance. Within this framework, the role of the board of 
directors is concentrated on protection of the rights of “principals” (shareholders) through 
monitoring the actions of “agents” (executive directors) (Kosnik, 1987). To be more precise, there 
can be the situation when executives do not comply with established procedures or set goals, and 
this results in agency costs; members of the board of directors can contribute to the company 
performance through ensuring that directors are focused on shareholders’ objectives and 
performance, also through control of the directors and strategic decision making (Mizruchi, 1983). 
As is shown, there are different theories and perspectives that describe the role of the board 
of directors and specific functions associated with these roles. What can be concluded for sure is 
that board of directors is playing crucial role and when someone is speaking about the company 
performance, contribution from the boards should be taken into account. Besides, it is possible to 
specify three functions of the board of directors that appear in majority of the works though can 
be formulated in different words: 
1) strategic decision making; 
2) recruiting, monitoring and controlling of the executives; 
3) advising to the executives on the important decisions. 
If to take a closer look at the Russian laws as this research will be focused on the boards of 
directors and performance of the Russian companies, there is Federal law “On Joint-Stock 
Companies”. The law has separate sections devoted to the shareholders, board of the directors and 
executive board. The law identifies list of the questions that are in the area of board of directors’ 
responsibility, among which are the following: identification of the priority areas for the company 
activities, different actions connected to the annual shareholders meeting, decisions on the 
company’s shareholder equity, recruitment of the executive board and decisions on early 
termination of their contracts, recommendations on dividends, subsidiaries and branches 
establishment, and some other questions (article 65, point 1). However, it is important to mention 
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that all these areas of responsibility should also be mentioned in the articles of association, because 
companies can decide to change the responsibility aspect or the “distribution” of the responsibility 
within the company and are to reflect this in their internal documents. 
Moreover, the law contains the rules related to the composition of the board of directors, 
for example, the size of the board of directors should be at least 5 members, while the upper 
constraint is not mentioned (article 66, point 3). In case there are more than 1000 shareholders 
with voting shares, the board should consist of at least 7 members, if there are more than 10000 
shareholders – at least 9 members. Another constraint connected to the composition of the board 
of directors implies that no more than 25% of the board members can be executive directors in the 
same company (article 66, point 2), and there are no more other constraints devoted to the board 
of directors’ composition. 
At the same time, the Bank of Russia has published Corporate governance code which is 
not considered as law but contains so called recommendations for the companies to ensure high 
quality of the corporate governance practices. Within the description of main corporate governance 
principle attributed to the board of directors, it is again emphasized the importance of the board 
within fulfilling the role of strategic decisions maker and other roles mentioned above and related 
to the executive board. Among the principles, there are several points regarding the composition 
of the board of directors. For example, even though the law does not mention any necessity for the 
independent directors, in the Code of corporate governance it is stated that the board of directors 
should have “sufficient amount” of independent directors. In the subsection to this principle 
authors mention that it is recommended to have at least one third of the board as independent 
directors. Within the research, the Code of corporate governance and recommendations from it 
will be mentioned not once, but so far it can be seen that much attention is paid to the composition 
of the board of directors and to its role and functions within the company.  
Board of directors, being such an important mechanism of the corporate governance, is 
expected to contribute to the company performance, which can also be logically concluded from 
its functions described above. Saying that, it means that for the better understanding of the ways 
for company performance improvement, one can have a look at the board of directors, the way it 
is composed, and the characteristics of the members included into it.  
In general, there can be two types of the studies of the relationship between board 
composition and firm performance. The first one is aimed at providing the insights into the 
behavior of the board within accomplishing different tasks (e.g., CEO recruitment, making a 
takeover bid or defending against it depending on the situation); second approach is looking into 
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the correlation between overall firm performance and board composition (Bhagat, Black, 1999). 
Second approach suggests analyses of such characteristics as board size, percentage of outside 
directors, percentage of independent directors, percentage of busy directors, gender diversity and 
so on in connection to the company performance measured in different ways. Even though some 
studies are concentrated on the behavior of the boards and others are concentrated on their 
composition in connection to the demographics, Pfeffer (1983) states that behavior and processes 
within the board should not necessarily be studied separately because of the fact that beliefs and 
behavior usually result from members’ demographic characteristics. 
According to Rindova (1999), examination of the board composition implies three 
important ideas: there is simultaneous performance of different tasks by the board at the same time, 
tasks performance is connected to the company characteristics and the environment it is operating 
in, directors are playing their roles through provision of the knowledge, experience, skills and 
connections they have. Board members and their capabilities differ from each other because of the 
variability of previous professional experience, because of business exposure and specific skills. 
Obviously, the diversity and variety of the skills and experiences turns into a ‘mosaic of decision 
making structures and subsequent firm behavior’ (Markarian, Parbonetti, 2007). 
Because of the importance of the board of directors, there has been done big research on 
its composition and characteristics; however, it is difficult to find consensus between the 
researchers on what is the best configuration for an effective board of directors (Johnson, Daily, 
Ellstrand, 1996). Interest to the relationship between board characteristics and company 
performance is reflected not only in academia, but also regulatory circles and capital markets 
(Markarian, Parbonetti, 2007); and there are different findings that indicate contradictory, weak or 
even none relationship between the board of directors’ characteristics and company performance. 
Structure of the corporate board and its influence on the company’s results is considered to be one 
of the most debated issues in the field of corporate finance. As a result, it is not possible to choose 
specific board composition as the best or optimal one (Boone et al., 2007). 
There is big amount of the works examining the relationship between board size and 
company performance, because on the one hand small boards can be more coherent, on the other 
hand, big boards can have broader view on the problems and combine variety of knowledge and 
experience of its members (Cheng, 2008; Mak, Kusnadi, 2005; Guest, 2009). 
Another characteristic of the board that is in the spotlight for many years among the 
researchers in corporate governance is the fraction of outside directors. Usually as inside directors 
are considered those that serve as firm officers, outside directors can be defined as ‘all non-
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management members of the board’ (Johnson et al., 1996). Inside directors can be the source of 
information specific for the company, but private benefits can influence their objectives and lead 
to harmful for the company performance (Raheja, 2005); whereas outside directors are supposed 
to monitor independently but can be less informed about the company and environment it is 
operating in (Linck et al., 2005). Moreover, according to the agency theory, the greater the 
proportion of outside directors is, the better firm performance should be due to the presumed 
independence of outsiders (Shleifer, Vishny, 1997). At the same time, different investigations have 
shown that the relationship between outside directors and company performance is not always 
proved to be significant, though opposite results have also been received with an accent on the fact 
that outside directors can positively contribute to the advisory role through specific knowledge or 
experience (Coles et al., 2014; Faleye et al., 2011). 
Another group of directors on board refers to the independent directors. Since 1990s there 
has been a trend of pushing increased representation of independent directors in the boards by the 
governance reformers (Meng et al., 2017); however, as in the previous case, the practical benefits 
of appointing independent directors are still questionable (Bhagat, Black, 2001). In a sense, role 
of the independent directors is similar to the role of outside directors, the difference is mostly in 
the level of independence, with the assumption that independent directors have higher level of 
independence and are able to be unbiased while making decisions and monitoring the management 
team. 
Currently more and more attention is attributed to the gender diversity within the board of 
directors in addition to different ages and ethnicity. In the beginning of the 21 century it was 
already an international trend for having more women on board (Holton, 2000). Right now, there 
are appearing specific quotas on women representations in the board (e. g. quota laws in Spain, 
France, Germany and other countries). The reasoning for having women on board implies 
women’s opportunity to serve as role models, carry symbolic value in the way that high performing 
women can be promoted to higher positions and reflect changes in the women’s issues of 
recruitment (Billimoria, Wheeler, 2000). In addition, having women on board can help to build 
links to the environment and bring strategic input (Fondas, 2000). Mixed results on the relationship 
between women on board and company performance initiates further research especially taking 
into consideration increasing boardroom diversity in the companies (Post, Byron, 2015). 
All in all, board of directors and its characteristics are definitely in the focus of the modern 
research that aims at understanding which characteristics or which composition can be the key to 
successful company performance. Board traits mentioned above do not represent finished list of 
the characteristics that are crucial for overall board performance, and further in this research we 
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will concentrate on other aspects as well. So far we can conclude that board of directors’ 
importance leads to the necessity of examining composition of this corporate governance 
mechanism, studying different characteristics in connection to the company performance and 
making conclusions and recommendations based on the results of such studies. 
 1.2. Intellectual capital of board of directors and its components 
No one can argue that today’s economy is based on knowledge, and intellectual capital is 
playing a significant role in the process of value creation within the organizations (Muttakin, Khan, 
Belal, 2015). Intellectual capital concept transforms into new base and driver for the economic 
progress, as influence of the fixed or financial assets in comparison to intangible assets is currently 
decreasing (Gogan et al., 2016). Market value of the companies is more and more exceeding the 
book value of the tangible assets, making it clear that there is something else inside the companies 
that contributes to the value. In the management literature one can find that intellectual capital 
concept is used in order to understand how knowledge is acting as crucial value-creating asset 
(Kianto, Saenz, Aramburu, 2017).  
Some authors argue that success of the companies is highly dependent on their ability to 
“notice” and use their intellectual capital in order to create organizational advantage (Nahapiet, 
Ghosal, 2000). Saying that, previous research has proved that there is relationship between the 
intellectual capital and company performance (Kamukama, Ahiauzu, Ntayi, 2010).  
Keenan and Aggestam (2001) can be considered as one of the first authors who identified 
relationship between intellectual capital and corporate governance; according to them, 
decisionmakers are supposed not only to use and get advantage from financial and physical capital, 
but also utilize intellectual capital in the company to the fullest. While intellectual capital reflects 
knowledge and knowing capability of social collectivity, such as professional practice, intellectual 
community or organization (Nahapiet, Ghosal, 2000), corporate governance uses ‘financial, 
physical-plant, and intellectual capital to create and leverage value’ (Keenan, Aggestam, 2001). 
However, the research on the link between the intellectual capital and corporate governance within 
its different forms is limited (Muttakin et al., 2015). According to Berezinets, Garanina, Ilina 
(2017), people and knowledge they have, specific know-how, capabilities for innovation, 
relationships with stakeholders, corporate culture are becoming now the most important resources 
for development of the companies; besides, it is crucial not only to have these resources, but also 
to be able to manage them efficiently.  
Within such a fast-changing environment everything is dependent on structural capital, 
relational capital and human capital – aspects that are often included in the notion of intellectual 
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capital (Kamukama et al., 2010; F-Jardon, Martos, 2009). At the same time, when one mentions 
intellectual capital within the company, it does not necessarily mean that intellectual capital can 
be generated only by the employees or internal stakeholders; suppliers, strategic allies, external 
partners and others can also become the sources of intellectual capital for the company. As was 
mentioned above, board of directors is playing crucial role in companies, and it is possible to 
assume that members’ characteristics are adding value to the company and can also become source 
of competitive advantage (Berezinets, Garanina, Ilina, 2017).  
According to Sveiby (1997), intellectual capital can be viewed in three ways: internal 
structure, external structure, and also employee competence. Later, these three categories were 
“transformed” into organizational capital, customer capital and human capital (Edvinsson, 
Malone, 1997); however, term customer capital was also later turned into relational capital (Pablos, 
2003). As is mentioned in the book by Roos et al. (2007), organizational capital stands for 
everything that is left inside the company when employees have left the company but this is not 
reflected in the balance sheet of the company; human capital implies all the characteristics that 
describe the individuals as resources for the company but cannot be replaced by robots or stated 
on the paper, and social capital implies all the relationships company has with clients, customers, 
intermediaries, suppliers, partners, shareholders and creditors. 
If to give a definition for intellectual capital of the board of directors, it is possible to refer 
to Nicholson, Kiel (2004), according to whom intellectual capital of the board is formulated as the 
following: ‘the intellectual resources such as knowledge, information, experience, relationships, 
routines, and procedures that a board can employ to create value’. These described characteristics 
can be classified within the notion of intellectual capital given before, and it is proven by the 
scholars that these attributes are contributing to firm value creation (Donaldson, Davis, 1994; 
Westphal, 1999). Besides, even if the intellectual capital notion can seem too broad from the first 
sight, this broadness is attractive for the reason that it results in multidimensional perspective for 
the ways the board of directors is influencing firm performance (Nicholson, Kiel, 2004). 
Board of directors is usually considered to be the source that generates human and social 
capital; human capital of the board of directors includes skills and knowledge of the members of 
boards of directors, whereas social capital reflects networks directors are involved in, their 
relationships with each other as well as with other stakeholders (Berezinets, Garanina, Ilina, 2016). 
Members of the boards provide companies with human capital, for example, they are the 
source of the knowledge they obtained thanks to their education (Certo, 2003). Furthermore, not 
only the knowledge from the universities is important, directors bring to the companies their 
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previous work experience, from which they can get valuable information about the customers and 
suppliers, about the industries in general (Pfeffer, Salancik, 1978; Carpenter, Westphal, 2001). 
Also, it is important to mention that directors have different knowledge and expertise also due to 
international experience, different functional backgrounds; sometimes it is crucial to have not only 
the knowledge about the industry company is operating in but also about other industries. 
According to Abeysekera (2007), human capital can also be divided in seven subcategories: 
training and development, entrepreneurial skills, equity issues, employee safety, employee 
relations, employee welfare and employee-related measurements. Further we will provide more 
detailed explanation how these characteristics of the directors can be beneficial for the companies. 
Human capital can also be divided into two groups: general human capital and specific 
human capital (Becker, 1975); general human capital means skills and abilities that can be useful 
in general in different situations, whereas specific human capital refers to knowledge and 
experience more specific to the particular company. However, we are not going to divide human 
capital into these two groups and consider both types of human capital together. Boards of directors 
have to perform different tasks to fulfill their role and help the company to achieve better results 
in the future, and many authors discuss board composition while reflecting its human capital needs 
(Conger, Lawler, Finegold, 2001; Charan, 1998). 
As was already mentioned different characteristics of the board members can be beneficial 
for the companies on boards of which they are serving. To start with, Carpenter and Westphal 
(2001) in one of their studies concluded that if a director has experience in companies similar to 
the one he is serving for now in terms of corporate strategy and environments, he will have positive 
impact on the results of this similar company. If the company is operating in stable conditions, 
experience from similar companies facilitates quality improvement of the decision-making process 
and results in better performance; if the economic conditions are unstable, still knowledge and 
experience is useful because it helps to perform monitoring functions in a more effective way and 
be able to find ways out in not typical situations. 
International experience is useful due to the ability or skill it creates to make more balanced 
and more effective decisions in the international perspective, and there is direct relationship 
between international experience of board members and the revenue abroad of the company they 
are serving for (Carpenter, Pollock, Leary, 2003). Another aspect of valuable experience is 
connected to the experience in mergers and acquisitions. If directors have this experience, it leads 
to better results for the company in case it decides to go through these processes as well; experience 
and specific knowledge again results in higher quality of the decisions made (Kroll, Walters, 
Wright, 2008).  
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As an addition to mergers and acquisitions experience, there can be other narrow areas or 
situations that create specific yet very valuable experience; accumulated knowledge or expertise 
can be of great use later once board members face difficult situations where they have to deal with 
important strategic questions (McDonald et al., 2008). Experience in raising capital or work in 
venture companies provides directors with expertise in the field of attracting more investments, 
and it is even shown that companies where boards have directors with such expertise on average 
tend to get lower interest rates for borrowing compared to the rates obtained by the companies 
without directors with such expertise (Boeker, Wiltbank, 2005). 
Moreover, this experience in narrow specializations creates more diversity on the board 
which is associated with more innovation within the company. Board members coming from 
different industries with different knowledge and experience can have much broader view on the 
problems and have much bigger pool of the ideas on how to tackle these problems. There are 
studies that show that diversity of the knowledge, opinions and views in the end provides with 
better solutions to the problems and deeper understanding of the problems; board members 
interact, discuss their ideas and them come up with innovative and high-quality solutions all 
together (Van der Vegt, Janssen, 2003). 
Another characteristic that describes human capital of the board members can be tenure in 
this company, and it can be used as a proxy parameter for human capital. View on the relationship 
between tenure and quality of the decisions can be ambiguous: the more director is serving for the 
company, the more knowledge he obtains about specifics of this company, the more informed and 
aware he becomes (Golden, Zajac, 2001); at the same time, if the director is working for the same 
company for too long, at a point he or she can become blind and not able to notice new 
opportunities or raising issues in the external environment, quality of monitoring from this director 
also becomes questionable (Hillman et al., 2008). Because of the problem that after certain point 
of time directors stop being as unbiased as they probably were in the beginning of their work for 
the company, some corporate governance codes suggest constraint for the number of years when, 
for example, independent directors are still considered to be independent. According to the Russian 
Corporate Governance Code, if independent director spends in the board of directors more than 
seven years, he or she stops being considered as independent director. 
Gender diversity is also considered to be part of human capital of the board of directors 
and there are studies that show that women on board can bring positive effect to the performance 
of the company. More specifically, women tend to pay more attention to environmental issues and 
corporate social responsibility, they actively participate in the work of committees and are able to 
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improve the quality of the decisions (Adams, Ferreira, 2009; Nielsen, Huse, 2010; Bilimoria, 
2000). 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) usually conducts the surveys about corporate governance 
in Russia among the members of boards of directors of big Russian companies. According to one 
of the surveys, human capital in form of experience, knowledge and skills is considered to be one 
of the main factors influencing performance of the companies (PwC, 2012). Moreover, work 
experience in similar sector is named as the most crucial constituent of human capital. Because of 
the unstable economic conditions and changing environment, knowledge of risk-management and 
international experience are valued a lot as well and can be source of competitive advantage. 
Social capital as was already mentioned before is defined as relationships between the 
board members and external stakeholders (Devos et al., 2009; Hillman et al., 2011). Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development defines social capital as the following: ‘networks 
together with shared norms, values and understandings that facilitate cooperation within or among 
groups’ (Cote, Healy, 2001). Social capital can also be viewed as parallel to and complementary 
with other intangible capitalizations (Manning, 2010). Wincent et al. (2010) agree with these 
definitions in their study and mention that network of the directors and assets they can get from 
these networking opportunities are important part of the social capital. Even though academics 
have similar definitions for social capital, it is more difficult to choose indicators and measures of 
social capital of boards of directors members (Berezinets, Garanina, Ilina, 2016). In the next part 
of this chapter social capital measures will be discussed. 
1.3. Social capital of board of directors and its measurement 
If to think in general why social capital in terms of the networks and connections can be 
useful, at least three explanations can be provided (Lin, 2017). Firstly, networks promote flow of 
information. In many theories among the main assumptions it is possible to meet the assumption 
about perfect information; however, it is almost never the case for the real situations. Social ties 
and connections with important people on important positions can diminish lack of information 
and show the choices or opportunities which would be unknown without the information from 
others. The ties can show new interesting markets or any other strategic opportunities that can 
result in huge shift in the development of the company. Secondly, network and connections let not 
only get the information not available before, but also can allow to influence those who are making 
decisions in external environment; in other words, social capital provides with an ability to 
influence and change something, which obviously can be beneficial for the companies. Thirdly, 
social connections in a sense prove credibility of the directors, they show that there is someone 
19 
 
else “behind” the director who can facilitate again access to the resources and bring much value to 
the company. 
In general, social capital can be viewed not only as connection to the external environment, 
but also as the ties inside the company and inside the board of directors. Some studies suggest that 
social capital in the form of ties within the board is more important and results in more influence 
on the board compared to human capital of the directors (for example, committee membership or 
management experience) or so called external social capital (ties outside the company and the 
board) (Stevenson, Radin, 2009); however, within this study we are concentrating on the 
connections outside the company. 
Social capital can also be considered as multidimensional concept. There are three 
dimensions identified by Nahapiet and Ghosal (1998): structural, relational and cognitive 
dimensions. Structural social capital describes real links or bonds between individuals and answers 
the question if actors actually know each other. Relational social capital reflects the nature of these 
links: for example, whether individuals trust each other or not. Cognitive social capital is ‘the level 
of shared mental schema of the two linked actors’ (Nicholson, Alexander, Kiel, 2004). Such 
approach is consistent with the view that not only links are important, but also nature of these links 
(Burt, 1992; Scott, 2011). 
Adler and Kwon (2002) in one of their works stated that people use their networks in order 
to create direct and indirect links to other people and organizations. Such connections or links can 
be important for the company performance because they do facilitate exchange (Nahapiet, Ghosal, 
2000), and through this exchange people are able to accumulate and leverage goodwill in order to 
get information, solidarity and influence (Adler, Kwon, 2002). As social capital is mostly 
attributed to the network and relationships, multiple directorships can be considered as parameter 
that describes social capital of the board of directors (Devos et al., 2009). At the same time, it is 
still important to realize that through the multiple directorships board members are developing 
human capital as well (Kor, Sundaramurthy, 2009). The line between social capital and human 
capital is not strictly defined and is more relative, because all the components are connected to 
each other, and, for example, through multiple directorships board members get more knowledge 
and experience which are usually attributed to human capital. 
Board member can be characterized as a director with multiple directorships in case he or 
she is serving on the board of directors of several companies (Benson et al., 2014). According to 
Cashman, Gillan, Jun (2012), term ‘busy director’ can be used only for describing independent 
directors, but this opinion is not shared by all academics. At the same time, inevitably the following 
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question arises: how many directorships should a director hold to be considered as a busy director? 
Majority of the scholars chooses three positions as a threshold (Fich, Shivdasani, 2006; Cashman, 
Gillan, Jun, 2012); however, we believe that this can differ depending on the context the study is 
conducted in. Environments in which companies are operating are different, corporate governance 
practices also differ depending on the country, so this leads to an assumption that definition of the 
‘busy director’ term can also differ and be specified by the researchers in particular case.  
Busy directors can be considered as main source of the social capital due to their access to 
different companies, people and resources. Big companies on average tend to hire busy directors 
more compared to small firms (Booth, Deli, 1996); through busy directors companies get access 
to wide network that can help to establish contacts with such parties as customers and suppliers. 
Similar results were shown in the research by Ferris et al. (2003), according to which big and 
profitable companies have more busy directors on board. Moreover, this ‘connection’ works in the 
opposite direction as well: directors that hold positions in big and well performing companies have 
higher chances to be invited to serve on the board of other companies. 
Companies that are planning IPO are also interested in having busy directors on board 
(Field, Lowry, Mkrtchyan, 2013). Authors studied American companies in the period of 1996-
2008 and concluded that even though busy directors might be not good at performing monitoring 
role, they are still bringing values to the companies. Values are derived from experience busy 
directors have, from their connections and knowledge, which in the end transform busy directors 
into ideal consultants who are necessary for companies at this stage of development. Besides, 
authors state that busy directors can be more valuable for young companies, when monitoring 
function does not require that much efforts compared to the advisory function or role; as a result, 
busy directors due to the characteristics they have can be better advisors. Eventually, with 
companies getting older and bigger, monitoring function becomes more and more important and 
at this point having too many busy directors on board can stop being an advantage and can start 
bringing negative effects. 
If to look at the situation from other perspective and discuss not motives of the companies 
to hire busy directors, but motives of the directors themselves to serve on multiple boards, first it 
is possible to consider reputational factor. Directors who are invited to the boards of many 
companies are earning good reputation, because the attention from the companies means that there 
is something valuable that this particular director can bring to the company (Fama, Jensen, 1983). 
In other words, this reputational effect works the following way: multiple directorships give signal 
to the market that director is performing his duties on a high level if many companies are willing 
to see him or her as part of their board of directors. Serving on the boards of several companies is 
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translating the message that director has competences in consulting and is also supposed to perform 
monitoring function well. In order to be a good consultant, it is necessary to have various 
experience and knowledge in different aspects and fields, which will result in better for the 
company decision. Knowledge, experience, connections and access to different resources allow 
busy directors to show better performance (Kor, Sundaramurthy, 2009). 
Serving simultaneously on the boards of several companies gives busy directors 
opportunity to compare the activities of different companies, compare the approaches and 
decisions made in different situations and within different external conditions, and also get an 
advice from their colleagues in other companies. Membership on multiple boards gives a director 
an overview of wide set of problems and possible solutions (Beckman, Haunschild, 2002). 
Directors are able to use the network for keeping updated the companies they are serving for with 
the procedures and practices from other companies (Haunschild, 1993). Eventually, busy directors 
obtain great human capital in addition to social capital, and the companies they are working for 
are able to benefit from this. Such state of affairs corresponds to the resource dependence theory 
developed by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), according to which companies and their performance 
are dependent on external environment. Busy directors are able to attract necessary resources to 
the company in an easier and faster way, and also increase the value of the company (Pfeffer, 1972; 
Booth, Deli, 1996). Another aspect in which busy directors can bring value to the companies is 
through supplying with managerial talent (Rosenstein et al., 1993). 
On the other hand, along with all these advantages busy directors can bring to the company, 
there are definitely some costs associated with busyness. One can start wondering if busy directors 
have enough time for performing their duties in an appropriate way or will one company suffer 
because busy director will be literally too busy and will not have enough time for serving well on 
the boards of all the companies. As holding a director position is considered to be respected job 
with many benefits (Useem, 1982), directors can be eager to accept invitations to serve on several 
boards not spending enough time on analyzing if they can really do that. In order to be efficient, 
directors need to study company’s specific strategic and any other kinds of problems (Carter, 
Lorsch, 2004), but if director is overbusy, he will not get an opportunity to do this. Moreover, busy 
directors might have to miss the board meetings or come unprepared for them (Finkelstein, 
Mooney, 2003), and then the contribution to the company performance of such directors becomes 
questionable. If directors are not able to sufficiently immerse into company’s activities, the level 
of their contribution is negatively affected (Baysinger, Hoskisson, 1990). In fact, in the case of 
overbusyness, company’s competitiveness and growth generation abilities can be hurt because of 
the lack of proper governance and advising by the directors (Kor, Sundaramurthy, 2009). 
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Basically, all the positive and negative aspects of multiple directorships can be formulated 
through several hypotheses that are known in the literature. Reputation hypothesis describes all 
the positive outcomes related to good reputation of the busy directors. It goes hand in hand with 
signaling theory as well, letting the market or external stakeholders see that board of directors 
consists of people with good reputation and, consequently, with strong knowledge, rich experience 
and variety of skills.  
Quality hypothesis is the one that implies the high quality of actions or decisions made by 
busy directors. This hypothesis can also be viewed from two angles: on the one hand, directors are 
invited to the boards because they are ‘famous’ for the quality of their work, for the decisions they 
make and solutions they find. On the other hand, once director becomes busy, this opens for him 
or her access to many resources and results in higher quality of his or her work. Third positive 
consequence of busyness comes from the resource dependence theory which was already 
mentioned, and which is devoted to the access to the resources busy directors are believed to have. 
Negative aspect of the multiple directorships is usually formulated as busyness hypothesis, 
concern of which lies in the fact that there are time constraints for many activities, and if a person 
starts serving on big amount of boards, there is high probability that he or she will not be able to 
perform well or at least on the same level for all the boards of directors he or she serves on. 
Moving further with the description of multiple directorships concept, it is reasonable to 
provide some information on how busyness of the board of directors can be measured. 
Traditionally, first measure that can be used is share of the busy directors in the board. The metric 
itself is very simple, however there is again the question about whom to consider as a busy director. 
Classic definition suggests three directorships as a threshold (Fich, Shivdasani, 2006; Cashman, 
Gillan, Jun, 2012), however one can also refer to the average number of the positions or to the 
median value of the outside positions directors hold (Sarkar, Sarkar, 2009). Moreover, average or 
maximum number of the positions held by directors is also reflecting the situation with the 
busyness and can be used as a metric for busyness measurement. Besides, to describe the whole 
board some authors are using binomial variable which is equal 1 if 50% and more of the directors 
are busy, and 0 otherwise (Fich, Shivdasani, 2006). 50% threshold can also be questionable and 
authors can try to use different thresholds in order to see if this somehow influencing results of the 
research. As was mentioned, sometimes threshold for three positions does not reflect the situation 
correctly; and we can switch perception of board busyness from stating particular number of 
positions to stating that the board can be considered as busy once the relationship between 
performance is negative.  
23 
 
As was shown in this chapter, boards of directors play an important role in the companies 
and board members, their characteristics can be crucial for the company. Intellectual capital of the 
board of directors can be a source of competitive advantage for the company, and it is usually 
divided into two groups: human capital and social capital. Multiple directorships, which describe 
social capital, is a concept used towards board members that hold simultaneously directorships in 
more than one company. Because of the reason that multiple directorships and busy directors on 
boards can bring value on the one hand, and be harmful on the other, inevitably the following 
question appears: is it bad or good to have busy directors on board? Is there relationship between 
busy boards and company performance? Should the government or companies themselves 
introduce any constraints in regards to the number of positions for the directors or maybe 
constraints for the number or share of the busy directors on board? In the next chapters these 
questions will be answered.  
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2. COMPANY PERFORMANCE: AGENCY COSTS AND FINANCIAL INDICATORS 
Before answering the questions stated above, it is important to understand what company 
performance is and how it can be measured. Two angles of the company performance will be 
viewed: we will consider agency costs as possible reflection for particularly role of the board of 
directors and financial firm performance expressed with the use of different financial indicators. 
2.1. Agency costs: definition and measurement 
Before starting investigation of the agency costs, it is reasonable to see what agency 
relationship is and why agency costs occur. One of the classic works on this topic by Jensen, 
Meckling (1976) state that agency relationship is a ‘contract under which one or more persons (the 
principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which 
involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent’. In any situation that involves 
one party acting on behalf of another it is possible to assume that interests of both parties can not 
always be fully aligned. Because of this, the principal can come up with the tools that will help to 
make sure that agent’s actions are not harmful for the principal. For example, the principal can 
create incentives for the agent to act in the way which is good for the principal or incur monitoring 
costs that will be connected to limitation of agent’s aberrant actions. As is shown, once there is 
relationship between principal and agent, it is impossible to have no costs along with fully aligned 
actions of these two parties: the principal will have to have some costs to guarantee that agent is 
actually acting in principal’s interest. 
Companies can be placed on the line from zero agency costs case towards their increase in 
the size. Small businesses depict the case when there are low agency costs because separation of 
the ownership and control is not on the high level. At the same time, while the gap between owners 
and managers becomes bigger, agency costs also grow; companies where managers hold 100% of 
equity represent the extreme with zero costs, whereas at the other extreme there are companies 
where managers do not have single percent of the equity (Ang, Cole, Lin, 2000). 
There are a lot of studies that show that both financial and investment decisions, and, 
consequently, value of companies are influenced by the presence of agency conflicts and occurring 
agency costs (Florackis, 2008). At the same time, there are works that show that agency conflicts 
and costs can be reduced through different corporate governance mechanisms, and these 
mechanisms, both external and internal, can also help to increase firm value (ibid.). 
Agents can shirk their responsibilities as a result of moral hazard or adverse selection. 
Because of the moral hazard, agents expropriate the company’s value if they are not monitored; 
adverse selection is connected to the case when principals themselves are not capable of evaluating 
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the job of agents because of the lack of expertise (Eisenhardt, 1989). Contract can be a solution to 
these problems. It is necessary to make it outcome-based and make sure that the interests of the 
principals and agents are aligned. To make the interests aligned becomes easier when the agent-
manager holds some shares and represents also the owners, in this case moral hazard and adverse 
selection are minimized, whereas quality of the work of agent is maximized (Varela, 2017). As a 
proof, according to Argawal, Mandelker (1987), the greater the share of stock held by executives, 
the more managerial preferences aligned with the interests of stockholders. 
Agents have to perform their work in the uncertain and not fully predictable environment; 
besides, principals are not able to observe all the efforts and actions of the agents. Thus, there is 
necessity of special mechanisms that allow to monitor and report agents’ performance, and these 
mechanisms can be costly (Namazi, Rezaei, 2016). As there is a problem of information 
asymmetry, information disclosure can help to decrease the level of conflicts and costs; according 
to Ross (1979) and within the framework of signaling theory, firms without problems tend to 
disclose more information than distressed companies.  
Agency costs consist of three groups: monitoring costs by the principal, bonding costs by 
the agent and residual loss (Jensen, Meckling, 1976). One of the main factors that cause agency 
costs is information asymmetry which appears because of the separation of ownership from 
control. Managers (agents) are better informed about the situation inside the company and its 
activities, whereas owners (principals) do not always have access to this information or can receive 
this information in modified form. Another reason for agency costs appearance comes from 
impossibility to sign complete contract which would describe all possible scenarios and all 
possible ways of interaction (Fama, Jensen, 1983). 
Monitoring costs are probably type of the agency costs that is the most connected to the 
activities of board of directors. As was mentioned in the first chapter, one of the roles of the board 
of directors is monitoring of the actions of management. Besides, through the boards of directors 
shareholders are able to monitor the executives within the companies (Fama, Jensen, 1983). 
Another form of the monitoring costs can be viewed as costs for auditing. There are studies that 
prove that if there is no monitoring from the shareholders’ side, probability that managers will 
manipulate the figures, participate in financial frauds or make the decisions not contributing to the 
value creation or destroying this value is higher (Biddle, Hillary, 2006; Hope, Thomas, 2008).  
Bonding costs are also the costs that occur in order to guarantee that agents are acting in 
the interests of the principals, these are in a sense implicit costs occurring because of noncomplete 
contracts. Principals have to create such conditions when agents will have no reason to act not in 
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the interests of the principals. Finally, apart from the monitoring and bonding costs, residual loss 
implies losses in the firm value caused by the presence of the agency relationship between principal 
and agent: when there is difference between the decisions made and so called optimal decisions 
for the company that could maximize the value. Residual losses also take place because intention 
to fully enforce contracts between the shareholders and managers with monitoring and bonding 
can eventually outweigh the positive effects from this (Hijazi, Conover, 2011). 
Another classification that can be discussed when studying agency costs includes two 
groups: direct and indirect agency costs (Libman, 2005). Direct agency costs include monitoring 
and bonding costs. For example, costs occurred because of the shareholders meeting or due to the 
existence of the board of directors are considered as direct costs; direct bonding costs can be costs 
for the auditing, risk insurance and so on. On the other hand, indirect agency costs reflect earnings 
that were lost because of imperfection of control of the agents and incomplete contracts. Residual 
losses (opportunity costs) can be considered as indirect agency costs which take place because of 
the opportunistic behavior of the agents and conflict of interests of the organization.  
Reasonable question that arises next is connected to the issue of agency costs measurement. 
One of the approaches suggests choosing the company with zero agency costs and using it as a 
base for comparison with other companies (Ang, Cole, Lin, 2000). Zero agency costs can occur 
only in the company where the owner is also the manager at the same time, in this case there is no 
conflict between the principal and the agent, because the owner does not hire any agent for 
management functions (Jensen, Meckling, 1976). In order to find such a company, researchers can 
look among not public small companies where separation of the ownership and control has not 
happened yet (Ang, Cole, Lin, 2000). Such companies can be considered as base case and then be 
compared to the companies where agency costs take place. If to calculate the agency costs based 
on this method, it will be possible to recognize excessive costs. This approach uses absolute metric; 
however, the approach itself is difficult to be applied. As we just mentioned, researchers have to 
find not public company with the owner-manager, but even if such a company is found, it is very 
complicated to obtain enough information about it and conduct a profound research. Because of 
this problem many scholars are using relative metrics (Garanina, Kaikova, 2016).  
The approach with the relative metrics suggests using proxy-variables that can describe 
level of the agency costs in the companies. One can find different proxies with reasonable 
explanations why this or that metric can reflect the level of the agency costs in the companies.  
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In the study by Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) authors use two metrics for agency costs: asset 
turnover and expense ratio. Asset turnover (ATO) is calculated as sales divided by the total assets 
(equation 1) and reflects how well the assets are used in the company (Chiang, Ko, 2009).  
𝐴𝑇𝑂 =
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
(1) 
This metric is one of the most popular proxies for agency costs, and it shows the losses 
caused by not effective usage of the assets, bad investment decisions or managers’ poor job. As 
the metric shows how well the assets are used, the higher the ratio is, the lower the agency costs 
are. According to McKnight, Weir (2009), asset turnover ratio shows efficiency of the company 
and of the decisions made by management. Following this logic, if the asset turnover is low, there 
are high agency costs in the company. 
Talking about the expense ratio, one can find different expenses taken into account. One 
of the possible approaches is to calculate share of operating expenses in the revenues; another 
approach is to calculate share of selling, general and administrative expenses in the revenues 
(equation 2), and this ratio can be expressed as SGA. 
𝑆𝐺𝐴 =
𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙, 𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
 
(2) 
Share of selling, general and administrative expenses in the revenues is considered as the 
measure of direct agency costs of equity (Florackis, Ozkan, 2009). Selling, general and 
administrative costs usually include utilities, rent, lease payments, supplies, so that it reflects 
expenses on such facilities as furnishings, buildings, automobiles and similar. It can be expected 
that management can manipulate these expenses and use selling and advertising expenses in order 
to ‘camouflage expenditures on perquisites’ (Hijazi, Conover, 2011). 
Operating expense ratio (share of operating expenses in the total revenues (equation 3)) 
shows how management is controlling operating costs.  
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑥𝑝. 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
 
(3) 
As is explained by Ang, Cole and Lin (2000), if to compare operating expense ratio of the 
company where agency costs occur with the ratio of the company without agency costs (base case) 
and multiple the ratio of the no-agency-costs company by the amount of assets of the first 
company, it is possible to see the amount of direct agency costs. Moreover, if there are any 
excessive expenditures on perks or something else nonessential, this should be shown in the 
operating expenses. 
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Another approach to agency costs measurement is calculation of coefficient in the 
following way: free cash flow is multiplied by a growth dummy which equals 1 in case if 
company’s Tobin’s Q is less than 1. Logic behind this metric is that in case company which is 
managed poorly has higher amount of free cash flows, then this company has greater agency costs 
(Jurkus, Park, Woodard, 2011). Agency costs are high when high level of the free cash flows is 
connected to poor growth opportunities (Jensen, 1986). Dividend payout ratio can be considered 
as one more proxy for the agency costs and is calculated as amount of the dividends declared on 
the common stock divided by net income of the company (Jurkus, Park, Woodard, 2011). This 
ratio can show the ability of the company to generate incomes in the future; dividends can also be 
viewed as the instrument which decreases free cash flow and diminishes the opportunity for the 
managers to invest too much. 
Not typical measure for the agency costs can be considered as number of the acquired firms 
(Mcknight, Weir, 2009). Acquisitions can be used for increasing welfare of the managers and not 
of the shareholders; it is the way for managers to spend money without distributing cashflows to 
the shareholders. Utami and Inanga (2011) are using set of the variables to describe agency costs, 
among which are income, size, growth rate, and free cash flow; whereas leverage and dividends 
are used for describing financial policy in regard to agency problems. 
As there are many studies that show that company performance is significantly associated 
with the agency costs (Bruton, Keels, Scifres, 2002; Wu, Tu, 2007), we can conclude that agency 
costs can be viewed as characteristic of company performance, and in the case if the agency costs 
are very high, we can conclude that company is not performing well, while low agency costs can 
indicate good company performance. In a sense, company performance reflects the level of quality 
of company’s activities; thus, it describes company’s health. Saying that, not only the shareholders 
and managers are concerned about the company performance, but also other stakeholders show 
their interest in this topic. 
2.2. Financial indicators: market-based and accounting-based approaches 
For any company questions about its performance and results are always among the most 
important ones. Evaluation and analysis of the performance are fundamental for management of 
the company, no matter if this is a state-owned company or private one, big or small, from FMCG 
or oil and gas sector. Performance management related questions are discussed in both theoretical 
and applied researches on management (Thorpe, Holloway, 2008). 
Performance measurement should be conducted according to the nature of the activities 
that are analyzed; ones should use appropriate conceptual models which allow to concretize 
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description of the studied aspects (strategic, financial or operational) of the companies (Verweire, 
Berghe, 2004). At the same time, while evaluating the performance, it is also important to align 
evaluation metrics and tools to the nature of the one who is evaluating (top-management, 
shareholders, employees, consumers, suppliers and so on) (Kennerly, Neely, 2002). 
There are a lot of books and articles devoted to the notions of performance, effectiveness 
and efficiency, and this inevitably leads to the fact that there appear more and more definitions for 
this notion and approaches to its measurement. It is possible to identify at least six approaches to 
performance measurement (Prakash, 1971), among which one can find approach based on the 
balance sheet, tax-based approach, incomes and expenditures-based approach, approach 
describing development and stability of the company, approach that measures performance in 
terms of productivity, and finally approach based on costs. While some researchers identify six 
groups of different performance measures, there is widely accepted classification according to 
which performance indicators are divided into two groups: accounting-based performance 
indicators and market-based performance indicators. 
Initially accounting-based indicators were more widespread; this type of indicators is 
calculated using the information from accounting reports: balance sheet, income statement, cash 
flow statement. Return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), return on sales (ROE) and return 
on investments (ROI) can be considered as the most used once within this group.  
Return on assets (ROA) is usually calculated as operating income divided by the total assets 
(equation 4).  
𝑅𝑂𝐴 =  
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 (4) 
The ratio gives the understanding of effectiveness of assets usage, if the assets in the 
company are used efficiently and generate income. This measure is the most widespread, and in 
order to prove this it can be stated that at least one formula for ROA calculation is provided in all 
finance textbooks, ROA is almost always used in the researches for bankruptcy prediction, and 
ROA is very often used for measurement of company performance and its future perspectives 
(Jewell, Mankin, 2011).  
At the same time, it is needed to mention that there are lots of approaches of ROA 
calculation, at least 11 approaches can be found in the business literature (Mankin, Jewell, 2014), 
and main difference is in the numerator: one can use net income, earnings before interest and tax, 
operating income or any other types of income. Such a variety of calculations means that 
researchers should analyze first why and what they are going to use the indicator for. If, for 
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example, ROA is calculated in order to evaluate operating performance of the company, it is more 
reasonable to use operating income in the numerator. Bhagat and Black (2001) in their study of 
the relationship between board independence and company performance mention that there is no 
ideal performance indicator, but ROA is applicable and help to make conclusions about the 
performance.  
Another metric from the group of accounting-based performance indicators is return on 
equity which is calculated as net income divided by shareholders’ equity (equation 5). 
𝑅𝑂𝐸 =  
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠′ 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
 (5) 
Managers can use this indicator to show how well they are exploiting the capital provided 
by the shareholders. Many investors believe that this is one of the best performance metrics 
because it shows how effectively managers are using money of the shareholders. Besides, ROE 
can be depicted as multiplication of three other metrics: return on sales, assets turnover and 
financial leverage. This gives an opportunity for the managers to see the drivers for generating 
higher return on equity and shows which figures probably the company should focus on. Some 
consultants compare the spread between ROE and cost of the capital in order to see which 
companies are performing better. If the spread is positive, companies have growth opportunities 
(Reimann, 1989). ROE is also used in the studies devoted to relationship between the board size 
and company performance (Zhou, 2000). 
Return on investments can be used for evaluating the ability of the company to earn 
required returns, quality of the work of management and for forecasting future cashflows. This 
metric is used more seldom and is often compared to ROE, because essentially the idea behind 
them is similar. If ROI is higher than the cost of capital, one can conclude that company is doing 
well; moreover, ROI can be used more often for evaluation of the particular projects to see what 
is the return for required investments into it. For example, ROI is often used in marketing to 
evaluate efficiency of promotion campaign, though there are still studies where authors use ROI 
to link it with the corporate governance practices and to see if there is relationship (Gugler, 
Mueller, Yurtoglu, 2004). Choice of the numerator can be different same as in the case with ROA, 
and again it should depend on the situation and objectives of using this performance indicator. 
Sometimes usage of ROI can have constraints and lead to the conflicts between the departments, 
and for this reason another approach to ROI calculation was introduced. 
There are also other accounting-based performance indicators that can be easily calculated 
once financial reports are available; however, all these indicators have specific limitations and 
disadvantages. To start with, obviously financial reports and figures in them can be manipulated 
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by the managers themselves. If managers know that they will be judged based on the value of 
accounting-based indicator, they get an incentive to manipulate the numbers and get the value 
appropriate for them. Moreover, accounting-based indicators usually do not take into account 
further development of the company and future cashflows, they reflect more short-term 
perspective; that is why it is not reasonable to make decisions only based on this type of indicators. 
If only these indicators are used, companies can lose growth opportunities and positive long-term 
results; these indicators do not reflect systematic risk and do not take into account effects from 
R&D investments and advertising (Benson, 1985).  
Because of the limitations for accounting-based indicators, researchers are also considering 
market-based metrics. Among the most used market-based indicators there are Tobin’s Q, market 
value added, market-to-book value and economic value added. Calculation of these metrics 
supposes not only usage of the numbers from companies’ reports, but also with the numbers 
received from the market (Dulewicz, Herbert, 2004). 
Tobin’s Q was developed in 1968 and is calculated as market value of installed capital 
divided by replacement asset value. This indicator is one of the most used market indicators which 
reflects attractiveness of the companies; however, even though there is specific approach to 
calculation provided by the authors, this approach is very difficult to be used. Replacement asset 
value is not always possible to calculate, or it is very time-consuming. Some researchers came up 
with simplified approaches to calculation of Tobin’s Q. For example, Lindenberg, Ross (1981) 
suggest using the following equation 6: 
𝑄 =  
𝐶𝑆𝑀𝑉 + 𝑃𝑆𝑀𝑉 + 𝐷𝑀𝑉
𝑇𝐴 + 𝑅𝑁𝑃 − 𝐻𝑁𝑃 + 𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑉 − 𝐻𝐼𝑁𝑉
, (6) 
where CSMV is market value of common stock, PSMV is market value of preferred stock, 
TA stands for total assets, RNP is replacement value of current assets, HNP is historic value of 
noncurrent assets, RINV is replacement value of inventories and HINV is historical value of 
inventories. According to Schaller (1990), for finding Tobin’s Q it is necessary to calculate market 
value of the company through the market value of its equity and debt. Market value of the equity 
is equal to the market capitalization and can be easily found for public companies from the stock 
exchange information, but it is more difficult to calculate market value of the debt. To do this, it 
is necessary to calculate market value of the long-term debt making different assumptions about 
its maturity, yield, and as for market value of the short-term debt Schaller suggests to assume that 
it is equal to the book value of short-term debt. However, even this approach can seem to difficult, 
and Chung, Pruitt (1994) suggested another equation (7) of approximated Tobin’s Q: 
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𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑄 =  
𝑀𝑉𝐸 + 𝑃𝑆 + 𝐷
𝑇𝐴
, 
(7) 
where MVE is market capitalization, PS is the value of preferred stock, D stands for the 
value of debt and TA is total assets. In case it is impossible to get market value of the debt and 
preferred stock, authors allow using book value. Suggested approach is used in many papers that 
investigate relationship between corporate governance and firm performance (Coles et al., 2008). 
Tobin’s Q is considered to reflect growth opportunities of the company and intangible assets, and 
management’s figures manipulation becomes more complicated. 
Market value added (MVA) can be calculated as the difference between market value of 
the company and invested capital (equation 8).  
𝑀𝑉𝐴 = 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦′𝑠 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 − 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 (8) 
This metric shows quality of the management strategic decisions and can signal about 
changes in the strategy (Lehn, Makhija, 1996). It was also found out that there is positive 
relationship between earnings yield and MVA meaning that MVA can be used in order to evaluate 
company performance. 
One more market-based indicator frequently used in the studies of relationship between 
corporate governance and company performance is market-to-book ratio. This indicator is 
calculated in the following way: market value of company’s equity divided by book value. Market 
value is price of one share multiplied by the number of outstanding shares, and book value is the 
amount left in the company after the liquidation of all the assets and repayment of the whole sum 
of debt. This metric usually shows the market perception of the company, especially if the ratio is 
high, this means that market evaluates the company on high level and believes that real value of 
the company is much higher than its book value. Low ratio shows that company’s stock is not a 
good choice for the investment and company is not performing well. 
Economic value added (EVA) cannot be classified as only market-based indicator as its 
calculation requires getting some information from financial reports, it can still be discussed in 
this group because it is also considered as market-based coordinator and calculated according to 
the following equation (9): 
𝐸𝑉𝐴 = 𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑇 − 𝐼𝐶 ∗ 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶, (9) 
where NOPAT is net operating profit after tax, IC is invested capital and WACC is 
weighted average cost of capital. According to many authors, EVA allows to mitigate the 
disadvantages of accounting-based indicators and gives the real sense of the company 
performance.  
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EVA was developed by Stern Stewart & Co. From the first sight it can seem that the 
calculation of EVA is simple, however, this is not true. Stern Stewart & Co came up with around 
160 adjustments to the value of invested capital and profit, which should be first applied in order 
to find the real value; EVA is often compared to residual income. According to Young (1997), 
EVA describes the performance of the company so well that it can and should replace such metrics 
as earnings per share, net present value and return on assets.  
Stern Stewart & Co’s analysis showed that growth of EVA explains 50% of MVA growth, 
whereas, for example, sales growth explained only 10% of MVA change, EPS growth explained 
15-20% and ROE growth explained 35%. Such result indicates that EVA explains better changes 
in the shareholders’ wealth (Stewart, 1994). Among the advantages if this metric the following can 
be mentioned: assets in a sense transform into liabilities and managers have to show return on 
them, too much attention to EPS results in low investments in intangible assets, increase of 
financial risk (because of the debt increase) and complications in accounting. EVA can also be 
used as the metric based on which remuneration can be set; there is an opinion that EVA helps to 
solve the principal-agent problem (Young, 1997). When managers know that their remuneration 
depends on EVA, they start thinking as shareholders, their wealth is now dependent on the wealth 
of the owners. EVA is reminding to the managers to make decisions which will lead to the returns 
higher than the costs. EVA can also be used for the analysis of the performance not only of the 
whole company, but separately of the departments as well. Unfortunately, even though this 
indicator has so many advantages, it is extremely difficult to calculate it because these crucial 160 
adjustment are commercial secret of Stern Stewart & Co. Some authors were trying to identify 
these adjustments or develop their own, and Yook (1999) suggested his approach saying that with 
his approach to calculation numbers are similar to the ones got after calculating with the 
adjustments suggested by Stern Stewart & Co. These corrections are related to decrease of the 
assets by not interest-bearing debt, highly liquid securities, construction in process, increase of the 
assets by capitalized lease payments, doubtful debt reserves, LIFO reserves, capitalized R&D 
expenditures for last 5 years and other figures. 
Above there were described different metrics that allow to evaluate company performance. 
Obviously, all of them have advantages and some flaws, and whenever researcher is choosing any 
indicators, he or she should take into account the goals of the evaluation process and the 
environment in which these indicators are going to be used. Besides, many authors mention that 
in order to come up with more reasonable results, it is necessary to use several metrics preferably 
from different groups. This will make conclusions more valuable and more trustworthy if 
hypotheses are tested using different metrics for the company performance. 
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2.3. Relationship between intellectual capital of board of directors and firm performance 
As was described in the first chapter, intellectual capital of boards of directors includes 
human capital and social capital. One of the characteristics that can address both categories of 
intellectual capital is multiple directorships, or, in other words, number of directorships board 
members hold. There can be both positive and negative outcomes of having busy members on 
board and busy boards in general. 
Though there are some studies that find positive relationship between busyness and 
performance of the US companies (Core et al., 1999), majority of the studies in developed markets 
prove the busyness hypothesis and find negative relationship between director busyness and 
company performance (Fich, Shivdasani, 2006; Andres et al., 2013; Cashman et al., 2012).  
Cashman, Gillan, Jun (2012) conducted their study using the sample of American 
companies that covered 1999-2008 period, and there were three separate studies within this one: 
one for the companies that are included in S&P500 index, one for the companies that are not 
included in this index and one for all these companies together. First, when pooled regression was 
used, there was positive relationship between busyness and firm performance found for the sample 
that included all companies and sample that included small companies (for the sample with big 
companies relationship proved to be negative). However, after adding fixed effects to the model, 
for the cases with all three samples the relationship was negative. Such a result proves that it is 
also necessary to keep in mind the specifications of the models used and choose the appropriate 
model. The results of this study coincided with the results received by Fich, Shivdasani (2006) 
before.  
Studying the relationship between busyness of the outside directors and firm performance, 
Fich and Shivdasani (2006) used ratio of market to book value as market performance 
measurement indicator. Sample in this study consisted of companies from the Forbes 500 list and 
covered the period of 1989-1995. Results show that boards with busy directors on average have 
worse performance compared to the boards without busy directors. Besides, companies where 
boards have busy directors have lower return on assets, return on sales and asset turnover. One 
more interesting result received by these authors is that when director announces that he is going 
to hold one more directorship, value of the company where he was initially serving goes down. 
Similar result was received by Bar-Hava et al. (2018) who considered the following situation: what 
happens if busy director decides to leave one of the boards he is serving for, how do shareholders 
react to such decision? As was found out, shareholders positively react to such changes. Positive 
reaction means that investors feel necessity in the actions and time of the directors and react 
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positively once he or she gets more time for fulfilling his or her duties. Moreover, according to the 
authors, three positions is an optimal number of the positions to have: on the one hand, directors 
with three positions have enough time for good performance in all the companies they are serving 
for, on the other hand, these three directorships indicate good reputation and valuable experience 
of such a director. 
Investigation of the situation with German companies also showed that there is negative 
relationship between busyness and company performance (Andres, Bongard, Lehmann, 2013). 
Relationship was studied on the sample of 133 companies covering 2003-2006 period. Companies 
with such boards where directors are involved into social networks tend to have worse results than 
companies without such companies. As the performance measurement authors also use market to 
book value. In addition, authors mention that “quality” of the new position matters way more than 
the concept of busyness itself. 
This results into requirements in the company governance codes about the limitations for 
the number of additional directorships for the board members. However, if we have a look at the 
results obtained in the developing markets, first, we will notice, that average number of 
directorships per director will be much higher, and also that there is evidence for positive 
relationship between busyness and company performance. 
For example, for Colombian market Gutierrez, Pombo (2011) conclude that outside busy 
directors can be considered as key drivers for the improvement in the company performance, and 
a measure for company performance authors used return on assets. Authors conducted their study 
on the sample consisting of 335 companies and covering 1996-2006 period. As can be also noticed, 
in this case when authors were defining busy directors, they focused specifically on outside 
directors. In case of India, researchers found positive correlation between busy independent 
directors and firm performance (Sarkar, Sarkar, 2009); however, multiple directorships of the 
insiders are negatively correlated with the performance. Authors state that these results are not 
aligned with the results from American studies, but they assume that because of the institutional 
and cultural differences, for India resource dependence theory is more significant, the study 
included 500 large private companies. Moreover, authors understand that the threshold of three 
directorships for defining if a director is busy or not might not work for the Indian market and that 
is why test the results changing the threshold: for example, what happens if to consider the director 
as busy one if he holds one and more, two and more, three and more and so on directorships. 
The results of the study which included 4225 companies from all over the world and 
covered the period 2004-2010 also showed positive relationship between director busyness and 
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company performance (Omer et al., 2014). However, evidence from the Brazilian market suggests 
also negative relationship between busyness and company performance which is more similar to 
the results from developed markets (Santos, Silveira, Barros, 2012). The results of the 
investigation show that on average firm value is negatively associated with the higher level of 
board interlocking especially if there is the case of busy boars or case of the companies where 
CEO simultaneously holds other directorships in other companies. 
Some studies find no evidence of the relationship between busyness and performance. For 
example, in Turkey authors studied performance and boards of 290 companies and 2079 board 
members for the end of 2012 and performance and board of directors of 287 companies and 2066 
board members for the end of 2013 and concluded that there is no relationship between busyness 
of the board or quality of board advising and company performance (Arioglu, Kaya, 2015). 
Differences between the results for different markets can be explained by cultural, historical and 
institutional specifics. In developing countries it can happen that network and connections matter 
much more than knowledge, experience and skills. Sometimes knowing the right person in the 
right position can help to get better position or access to the resources which would be not available 
if the director did not know someone. 
Furthermore, some studies even claim that the differences in the results can be connected 
to contextual factors. For example, authors of the recent article (James, Wang, Xie, 2018) decided 
to see if there are differences between the busy directors’ impacts on firm performance depending 
on the location of the headquarters. It was found out that firm location affects the effectiveness of 
busy directors; Metro firm busy directors usually enhance firm performance. Moreover, they are 
associated with lower cash effective tax rate, lower real earnings management, lower default risk 
and better assets utilization. 
Besides, busyness can be different, some directors can have 10 positions and all in the 
companies of the same industries, other directors can hold 7 positions in the companies that 
represent companies from great variety of industries. It is reasonable to think which situation is 
better. On the one hand, multiple directorships within one industry brings better understanding of 
the industry and maybe more specific and deeper knowledge within it; on the other hand, 
companies from different industries can enrich knowledge and experience and provide with an 
access to the network of people from different businesses, which can be very beneficial afterwards. 
Exactly this question was studied in (Clements, Neill, Wertheim, 2015). The results of the study 
showed that there is a statistically significant positive relationship between the directors who are 
serving on the boards in the companies from related industries and effectiveness of the corporate 
governance. Authors also tried to see if there is any difference between the effects for small and 
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big companies, and it turned out that the effect of having directorships in the similar (industry-
wise) companies is stronger for small companies compared to the big ones. At the same time, the 
authors identified statistically significant negative effect on the effectiveness of corporate 
governance for small companies. This study is important as I am also considering the necessity to 
take into account different “ways” of being busy. 
Yet another question is which boards are considered to be busy? Many scholars agree that 
busy board is the one where 50% and more of the directors are busy (Fich, Shivdasani, 2006; Ferris 
et al., 2003). However, this approach can be argued and questioned, researchers may choose their 
own approach to board busyness measurement. Unfortunately, researchers usually combine both 
concepts of busy directors and busy boards, which is, in our opinion, sometimes can lead maybe 
to ambiguous results. What is also important to mention here is that even if there are specific 
results about the director busyness, they do not necessarily lead to the same conclusions for the 
board. For example, if there was proven positive relationship between company performance and 
director busyness, we still cannot claim that it would be advised to the companies to hire the 
directors with multiple directorships. Maybe it is more reasonable to have only 2-3 busy directors 
in the board and other non-busy.  
As is shown, there are different results obtained for relationship between busyness and firm 
performance: some authors claim that relationship is negative, others claim that it is negative, 
while there are also results stating that there is no relationship. Because, on the one hand, busyness 
can really be beneficial through knowledge, access to the resources, experience and networks, and 
on the other hand it can be harmful due to the lack of time, we believe that relationship cannot be 
linear. Saying that, our first hypothesis in this study will be the following: 
H1: There is non-linear relationship between board busyness and company performance. 
Almost all the studies mentioned above measure company performance in terms of 
financial performance, and typically several indicators are used. For example, authors can use 
return on assets and Tobin’s Q or market-to-book ratio. Other accounting-based indicators are used 
as well: for instance, return on assets or return on sales. We can see, that usually when researchers 
are discussing idea of performance, this implies financial performance. 
However, if we refer to the article by Muravyev, Berezinets and Ilina (2014), we can notice 
that among financial performance measures authors use SGA which is defined as sales, general, 
administrative expenses divided by revenues. As authors explain, this metric can also be among 
the performance measures and it shows managerial discretionary expenses and may serve as proxy 
for agency costs. Because of the idea that one of the main functions of the board of directors is 
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monitoring and advising to the managers, board of directors is considered as a mechanism that can 
help to lower agency costs in the company and through this improve company’s performance. 
Saying that, there are different studies that try to see what the relationship between different 
corporate governance mechanisms (inside the board) and the level between agency costs in the 
company is. 
One of the characteristics that is found to help to decrease the level of the agency costs is 
share of women on board. There is a cross-country analysis which tried to see how percentage of 
women on board is associated with the agency costs, three countries are studies: USA, Norway 
and Russia (Garanina, Kaikova, 2016). Authors found out that there is positive effect of percentage 
of women on board on the agency costs in American companies, negative effect on the agency 
costs in Norwegian companies and no effect of the women presence on board on the agency costs 
in Russian companies. Another board characteristic which was studied is the size of the board, and 
according to the results obtained, larger boards increase agency costs no matter which country is 
studied. Garanina and Kaikova (2016) analyze 175 Norwegian companies, 196 Russian companies 
and 243 American companies and covered the period of 2004-2012, and for the agency costs 
measurement two metrics were used: asset liquidity ratio and asset turnover ratio. 
Another study that investigates the relationship between agency costs and corporate 
governance was conducted by Florackis (2008), where the author tries to study the relationship 
between agency costs and such corporate governance characteristics as managerial ownership, 
compensation and ownership concentration, board size, proportion of non-executive directors on 
board, separation of CEO and chairman roles. The sample includes UK companies and covers 
period of 1999-2003, and for agency costs measurement author uses proportion of SGA expenses 
in revenues and asset turnover metric. Obtained results suggest that capital structure characteristics 
of companies (bank debt and debt maturity) constitute important corporate governance 
mechanisms for companies in UK; managerial ownership, compensation and ownership 
concentration are strongly associated with agency costs, and there is difference between the impact 
of corporate governance mechanisms on agency costs depending on firm growth opportunities. 
According to Ibrahim, Samad (2011), larger boards of directors help to mitigate agency 
costs; moreover, independent directors and duality are perceived differently by family and non-
family owned companies. For example, independent directors in family owned companies do not 
influence agency costs, while non-family owned companies need independent directors. Besides, 
in family owned companies duality role existence helps to mitigate agency conflicts. The study 
was conducted on a sample of 290 Malaysian public companies and covers period of 1999-2005. 
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We can conclude that there are different kinds of relationship between agency costs and 
corporate governance mechanisms. However, we did not observe any study where relationship of 
busyness and agency costs is tested, though we believe that there is connection. Again, role or 
effects of busyness are ambiguous: on the one hand, busyness can help directors to be more 
professional and perform their duties better, which will result in lower agency costs; on the other 
hand, because of the lack of time and lack of proper monitoring from the directors’ side agency 
costs can be high. Taking into account this ambiguity, we state the following hypothesis: 
H2: There is non-linear relationship between busyness and level of agency costs.  
To sum up, company performance can be viewed at least from two angles: firm financial 
performance and performance reflect through the level of the agency costs. As was shown above, 
there are different approaches and metrics used for measurement of financial performance and 
agency costs, and many scholars emphasize that usage of several metrics in the same study is more 
appropriate in order to get more reasonable results. In the next chapter it will be explained in more 
details which metrics are used to reflect board busyness, firm financial performance and agency 
costs in this particular study; two stated hypothesis will be tested in order to see if there is 
relationship between board busyness and company performance. 
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3. EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL 
CAPITAL OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND COMPANY PERFORMANCE 
In this chapter hypotheses stated in chapter 2 will be tested. Because the view on the board 
busyness is ambiguous, it is necessary to understand what the relationship between company 
performance and board busyness for Russian companies is. Chapter consists of four parts, in the 
first one methodology for testing the hypothesis will be explained and sample will be described. 
Next part will include econometric analysis, third part will contain analysis of the results and then 
chapter will be finalized with managerial implications. 
3.1. Methodology and sampling 
Empirical study goal of which is to see if there is relationship between board busyness and 
company financial performance, and also between board busyness and agency costs will be based 
on the following regression models (equations 10 and 11): 
𝐹𝑖𝑛_𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑢𝑖𝑡, 𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑁, 𝑡 = 2015, 2016 
(10) 
𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦_𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽4𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑢𝑖𝑡 , 𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑁, 𝑡 = 2015, 2016 
(11) 
where subscript i and t reflect company and time, dependent variable Fin_Performance is 
firm financial performance and measured as ROA or market-to-book ratio. Market-to-book ratio 
was chosen for describing market performance of the companies following long tradition of using 
this indicator (Fich, Shivdasani, 2006). The fact that many studies use this indicator for measuring 
the market performance, we will be able to compare the results with the previous studies. Return 
on assets was chosen for evaluating operating performance of companies in alignment with 
previous researches.  
For the Agency_costs we also chose two proxies that allow to make conclusions about the 
level of the agency costs in the companies. First metric is asset turnover, and in this case the higher 
number is, the lower agency costs are, which means that in case we use asset turnover as proxy, 
we expect negative relationship between this indicator and company performance. Second metric 
is expense ratio: share of selling, general, administrative expenses in company’s sales. In this case 
the bigger share is, the higher agency costs are, which leads us to the expectation of positive 
relationship between board busyness and this proxy. 
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Before defining the variable Busyness, it is necessary to explain more the idea behind the 
measurement of this variable. As was mentioned, in the studies authors use different approaches 
to busyness measurement: someone considers busyness of outside directors, some other authors 
concentrate on independent directors, and then there are also authors that investigate the busyness 
of any director no matter if he or she is insider, outsider (Fich, Shivdasani, 2006) or independent 
director (Cashman, Gillan, Jun, 2012). We believe, that it makes sense to investigate busyness of 
two groups of the directors: inside and outside directors. The reason why we do not include 
separately independent directors is because they are in the group of outside directors already and, 
additionally, it is very difficult to conclude if the director is indeed independent, especially in the 
case of Russian realities. Saying that, we have separate variables for busyness of inside directors 
and outside directors. In order to measure busyness, we choose the variable which describes 
average number of outside directorships held by the board member, so that for inside directors this 
means summing number of positions insiders additionally have and dividing it by number of inside 
directors and for outsiders this means summing number of positions outside directors hold and 
dividing it by the number of outside directors. 
Another important feature that should be mentioned here is that some Russian companies 
tend to appoint same people for the boards of all the companies that belong to one mother company 
or compose the same holding company. For example, Gazprom gazoraspredelenie consists of 235 
companies, and some of them are public companies traded on Moscow stock exchange. Majority 
of the directors in these companies hold directorships not only in one company, but in several, 
which makes us wonder if this kind of busyness is real or only “on paper”. Because of such 
specifics, we decided also to separately see average number of directorships held by insiders and 
outsiders in so-called “connected” companies and “not connected companies”. If companies 
belong to each other and are in the “mother-daughter” or “sister” relationship, we consider these 
companies as “connected”, in other case they are “not connected”. This division is important in 
order to be able to see if there is any difference in the relationship between the firm performance 
and nature of the multiple directorships. 
Board size is another variable that is usually included in the studies of corporate 
governance, and as also was shown in the previous chapter, size of the board of directors is usually 
associated with the level of agency costs. Vector FINit includes conventional control variables that 
describe the company, such as firm size, age and leverage, uit stands for random variable. Β1, β2, 
β3 are unknown coefficients and β4 is vector of unknown coefficients. 
More detailed description of the variables and the ways to calculate them is shown in the 
Table 1. 
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Table 1 
Variables description 
Variable Description 
1 2 
Dependent variables that characterize financial performance 
Market-to-book ratio Ratio is calculated as market value of equity plus the difference 
between the book value of the assets and book value of the equity 
divided by the book value of the assets  
ROA Return on assets describes operating performance and is calculated 
as earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets 
Dependent variables that characterize agency costs 
ATO Asset turnover shows how well company is using assets and is 
calculated as sales divided by total assets 
SGA Selling, general, administrative expenses ratio shows how much 
company is spending on SGA and is calculated as SGA expenses 
divided by sales  
Independent variables 
Busyness 
Av_Insider Variable that describes average number of the additional 
directorships held by inside director and calculated as number of the 
additional positions held by inside directors divided by number of 
inside directors 
Av_Outsider Variable that describes average number of the additional 
directorships held by outside director and calculated as number of 
the additional positions held by outside directors divided by number 
of outside directors 
Av_Insider_Conn Variable that describes average number of the additional 
directorships held by inside director in connected companies 
(companies that are part of the same holding or are in mother-
daughter relationship) and calculated as number of the positions 
held by inside directors in connected companies divided by number 
of inside directors 
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 Table 1. Ending of the table 
Variable Description 
1 2 
Av_Outsider_Conn Variable that describes average number of the additional 
directorships held by outside director in connected companies and 
calculated as number of the positions held by outside directors in 
connected companies divided by number of outside directors 
Av_Outsider_Notconn Variable that describes average number of the additional 
directorships held by outside director in not connected companies 
and calculated as number of the positions held by outside directors 
in not connected companies divided by number of outside directors 
Variables that characterize board composition 
Board_Size Variable that describes the size of the board of directors and equal 
to the number of the directors in the board 
Variables included in vector FIN 
Size Variable that describes the size of the company and is measured as 
natural logarithm of total assets 
Lev Variable that describes leverage of the company and is calculated 
as the debt divided by total assets 
Age Variable that describes age of the company and is measured as 
natural logarithm of the number of years since company’s 
establishment 
In order to test hypotheses, the following sample was chosen: 219 Russian public 
companies and period of 2015-2016. Number of the companies corresponds to the number of 
public companies for which all the necessary information about corporate governance was 
available, because, for example, some public companies do not have board of directors meaning 
they are not appropriate for our study. Banks and other financial services companies are excluded 
from the sample due to the fact that nature of their activities is different it is not appropriate to 
include them in the same sample with companies from other industries. Reasoning for chosen years 
is the following: in 2014 there was issued new corporate governance code in Russia, and the 
assumption is that after publishing new code, companies were supposed to revise corporate 
governance practices they are using and improve them in case this improvement was needed. 
Members are selected annually, meaning that the board selected in 2015 should reflect the changes 
if the company was planning to make any. Moreover, scholars believe that one year is enough for 
the board of directors to influence the company performance. Saying that, it is reasonable to 
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measure corporate governance characteristics and performance measures for the same point of the 
time. 
In order to collect the data, the following sources were used: 
• SKRIN database; 
• DATASTREAM database; 
• Data from MICEX stock exchange; 
• Annual and quarter company reports; 
• Official websites of the companies, 
from where the following data was obtained: financial results of the companies and corporate 
governance characteristics. Sample excludes banks and other companies that provide financial 
services because of the differences in the approaches to the activities. 
All in all, 438 boards of directors were studied, and number of directors in these boards is 
equal to 3672. Average number of the positions held by the director is equal to 2.37 meaning that 
if to use the definition that busy director is the one who holds three and more positions, average 
Russian director is not considered to be busy. Comparing this result with other markets, it is more 
similar to developed market rather than developing markets. For example, in the USA and 
Germany average number of directorships per director is three (Fich, Shivdasani, 2006; Andres, 
Bingard, Lehmann, 2013), while, for example, in India this number equals to 5 (Sarkar, Sarkar, 
2009). At the same time, descriptive statistics for sample of Turkish companies also shows that 
average number of the directorships per director is equal to 3 (Arioglu, Kaya, 2015). We believe 
that institutional and cultural differences do have their impact on the situations in the companies. 
If to compare percentages of busy directors in the boards, for Russian market average is 
38% which is even lower than the numbers received for developed markets: in the US average 
share of busy directors equals to 52.26%, and in Germany – 52.44%. If we have a look again at 
India, there average share of busy directors is 61.53% meaning that in Indian companies they tend 
to hire busy directors more. As for the board size, average size for Russian companies is equal to 
8.42, for American companies this number equals to 11.88, Germany – 13.58, India – 9.46, Brazil 
– 6.4 directors (Fich, Shivdasani, 2006; Andres et al., 2013; Sarkar, Sarkar, 2009; Santos et al., 
2012; Gutierrez, Pombo, 2011). 
Figure 1 shows distribution of directorships and allows to see how many directors hold 1, 
2, 3 and other amount of additional positions. We can see that almost half of the directors in sample 
do not hold directorships in other companies and fully devote their time to serving on the board of 
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one company. On the other hand, 11% of directors (416 directors out of 3672) serve on 7 and more 
additional boards. Among extreme cases as an example can be used members of Gazprom 
gazoraspredelenie who hold directorships in more than 50 companies. Unfortunately, even after 
the publication of corporate governance code, companies are still hiring overbusy directors. 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of additional directorships in Russian companies 
As we want to see more precisely the busyness in connection to the type of director and to 
“touch” the nature of busyness, let’s have a look and distribution of the directorships between 
inside directors and outside directors. Director is considered to be an insider if he holds executive 
position in the company where he serves on board, and an outsider is the director which is not 
employed in the company. As was already mentioned, independent directors are also in the group 
of outsiders. Figure 2 shows average percentage of inside and outside directors for 2015 and 2016. 
We can see that on average only 1/5 of the boards is represented by inside directors, whereas 
around 80% of the directors are usually non-employees of the companies. 
 
Figure 2. Average percentage of inside and outside directors on boards 
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Furthermore, figure 3 shows distribution of additional directorships among inside and 
outside directors. We can notice that inside directors usually hold less directorships than outsiders, 
and more than 65% of inside directors sit only on the board of the company they are working in 
not taking on additional directorships. At the same time, there are still some insiders that hold 7 
and more additional directorships, and this type of directors constitute for 6% of all inside 
directors. 
 
Figure 3. Distribution of additional directorships between inside and outside directors 
Now we can look at the distribution of the positions in connected and not connected 
companies. Figure 4 shows distribution of the directorships of inside directors in connected and 
not connected companies. 
 
Figure 4. Distribution of the directorships of inside directors in connected and not 
connected companies 
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As is shown on figure 4, inside directors mostly hold positions in connected companies. 
Almost no directors hold more than 4 additional directorships in not connected companies. If to 
look at the situation with outside directors, figure 5 depicts that outside directors also tend to serve 
more on the boards of connected companies, though in this case we see that there are still outside 
directors who hold 7 and more additional positions in not connected companies. 
 
Figure 5. Distribution of directorships of outside directors in connected and not connected 
companies 
From the observed information we can conclude that additional directorships are mostly 
directorships in connected companies, and this makes it even more interesting to see what the 
relationship between the directorships and company performance is. Before moving to the 
descriptive statistics of the variables used in the models, let’s see statistics that describe busyness 
of the directors in general, not averaging number of positions for the size of the board (table 2). 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics on director busyness 
Variable Observations Mean St. deviation Min Max 
# of directorships held 
by directors 
3672 2.37 4.60 0 67 
# of directorships held 
by inside directors 
667 1.25 2.73 0 20 
# of directorships held 
by outside directors 
3005 2.62 4.88 0 67 
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As can be seen from the table above, on average directors hold 2 additional positions in the 
boards of other companies; besides, there is director who holds at the same time 67 positions. This 
director is working in Gazprom gazoraspredelenie Rostov-na-Donu company and mostly holds 
positions in subsidiaries belonging to the same mother company. If we think about this in general, 
it is obvious that it is impossible for a director to effectively serve on the boards of 67 companies, 
and probably majority of these directorships is just stated on paper not requiring real participation 
in the work of the company. For the inside directors, maximum number of the directorships in 
other companies is equal to 20 and on average insiders hold 1.25 positions. Insider with 20 
directorships is serving on the board of the company TGK-1. As for outside directors, we can see 
that average number of additional directorships is higher and equal to 2.62, and the maximum 
number of 67 position belongs to outside director. Descriptive statistics for all other variables used 
in the models is shown in table 3 below.  
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics 
Variable Observations Mean St. deviation Min Max 
Av_Insider 438 1.08 2.52 0.00 20 
Av_Outsider 438 2.41 3.51 0.00 39.33 
Av_Insider_Conn 438 0.87 2.28 0.00 20 
Av_Insider_Notconn 438 0.22 0.73 0.00 6.5 
Av_Outsider_Conn 438 1.62 3.46 0.00 39.33 
Av_Outsider_Notconn 438 0.79 1.24 0.00 7.11 
Board_Size 438 8.42 2.38 5 17 
ROA 417 0.07 0.11 -0.32 0.45 
M-to-B 360 1.03 0.56 0.01 2.98 
ATO 392 0.62 0.59 0.00 2.83 
SGA 410 0.16 0.20 0 0.87 
Age 428 3.26 1.00 0 5.63 
Size 428 23.91 2.26 14.89 30.23 
Lev 428 0.23 0.24 0 0.98 
From the descriptive statistics, first, we can see that on average inside directors hold only 
one additional position, while outside directors on average hold 2 positions. At the same time, we 
see that average number of positions held by insiders in not connected companies is very low and 
is equal to 0.22, while similar variable for outsiders is equal to 0.79. Average board size is 8 
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directors and the range is from 5 to 17 directors. We can observe that on average Russian 
companies were performing with the return of assets equal to 7%; moreover, the market estimates 
Russian companies on average higher than their book value, as we see the average value for 
market-to-book ratio equal to 1.03. Further we will see the results of the econometric analysis 
received on the sample described. 
3.2. Econometric analysis 
As was already mentioned in previous parts, for financial performance measurement two 
indicators were chosen: return on assets and market-to-book ratio. Choice of these particular 
indicators was based on their applicability and also on the fact that they are used in many other 
studies of corporate governance before. Saying that, choosing same indicators allows to compare 
the results and come up with relevant comparison analysis. First, we will refer to the results 
obtained for the case when performance is measured with the use of ROA indicator. Table 4 
reflects the results obtained and includes three models: (1) is the baseline, (2) considers average 
number of directorships held by inside and outside directors (linear relationship), (3) considers 
average number of directorships held by inside and outside directors (non-linear relationship), (4) 
considers also distribution of the positions between connected and not connected companies (linear 
relationship) and (5) considers distribution of the positions between connected and not connected 
(non-linear relationship). 
Table 4 
Results of econometric analysis (1)1 
Variable 
ROAt 
1 2 3 4 5 
Av_Insider2 - - 0.0005 - - 
Av_Insider - -0.0038* -0.0087* - - 
Av_Outsider2 - - 0.0002** - - 
Av_Outsider - -0.0011 -0.0070** - - 
Av_Insider_Conn2 - - - - 0.0004 
Av_Insider_Conn - - - -0.0007 -0.0055 
Av_Insider_Notconn2 - - - - -0.0080** 
Av_Insider_Notconn - - - -0.0229*** 0.0112 
Av_Outsider_Conn2 - - - - 0.0002** 
                                                             
1 Stata screenshots of the models can be found in Appendices 1-5 
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Table 4. Ending of the table 
Variable 
ROAt 
1 2 3 4 5 
Av_Outsider_Conn - - - -0.0012 -0.0065** 
Av_Outsider_Notconn2 - - - - -0.0004 
Av_Outsider_Notconn - - - -0.0018 -0.0008 
Board_Size -0.0062** -0.0065*** -0.0060** -0.0055** -0.0054** 
Age 0.0121** 0.0123** 0.0121** 0.0120** 0.0116** 
Size 0.0100*** 0.0118*** 0.0135*** 0.0118*** 0.0124*** 
Lev -0.0577** -0.0586** -0.0563** -0.0590** -0.0589** 
Cons -0.1450** -0.1793*** -0.2123*** -0.1849*** -0.1948*** 
R2 0.0476 0.0572 0.0737 0.0745 0.1003 
p-value 0.0005 0.0005 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels is indicated by *, **, and *** respectively. 
To start with, all five models are statistically significant. We can see that coefficients in the 
baseline model are all statistically significant. Second model shows that there is negative 
relationship between the positions of insiders and return on assets, however, as was explained in 
chapter 2, we want to examine also non-linear relationship. Third model shows that there is 
negative relationship between busyness of inside directors and non-linear U-shaped relationship 
between ROA and outside directors’ busyness. However, if we try to see how many positions on 
average bring lowest ROA, this bottom value is equal to 17.5 positions. If we look at the studying 
sample we will find out that less than 5% of outside directors hold more than 17.5 positions. This 
means that we can accept that relationship between ROA and outside directors’ busyness is also 
negative and can be perceived as linear. The result is consistent with the results obtained in 
developed markets where busyness is negatively associated with company performance. The more 
directorships board members get, the worse operating performance of the company is, which 
means that busyness hypothesis in this case is strongly demonstrated.  
If we look further and consider separation between directorships based on the condition if 
the company is connected or not, there is statistically significant negative linear relationship 
between the average number of the positions held by insiders in not connected companies and also 
negative relationship between the positions held by outsiders in connected companies. As can be 
seen, relationship between the number of outsiders’ positions in connected companies is non-
linear; however, if we calculate the number where relation changes its direction from negative to 
positive, we will see that this number is equal to 16. Less than 5% of outsiders hold more than 16 
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positions in connected companies, and because of this we conclude that relationship is linear and 
negative. Explanation for such state of affairs can be that insider that serve in not connected 
companies have actually spend time on them, and that is why this company is suffering. Whereas 
positions of outside directors in connected companies in a sense lowers their unbiasedness and 
does not allow the to get access to new resources and networks, as usually industries are the same 
and people are more or less the same. It is reasonable to ask why there is no relationship between 
the positions of insiders in connected companies and between the positions of outsiders in not 
connected companies. One possible explanation can be that for insiders additional positions in 
connected companies do not bring too much and they do not require too much, because these are 
only positions “on paper”. Moving further, table 5 shows the relationship between busyness and 
market-to-book ratio. 
Table 5 
Results of econometric analysis (2)2 
Variable 
Market-to-Bookt 
1 2 3 4 5 
Av_Insider2 - - -0.0141*** - - 
Av_Insider - 0.0245* 0.1514*** - - 
Av_Outsider2 - - -0.0007 - - 
Av_Outsider - -0.0113 0.0038 - - 
Av_Insider_Conn2 - - - - -0.0096** 
Av_Insider_Conn - - - 0.0151 0.0877** 
Av_Insider_Notconn2 - - - - -0.0320 
Av_Insider_Notconn - - - 0.0493 0.1662* 
Av_Outsider_Conn2 - - - - -0.0006 
Av_Outsider_Conn - - - -0.0138* 0.0027 
Av_Outsider_Notconn2 - - - - -0.0246* 
Av_Outsider_Notconn - - - 0.0262 0.1229* 
Board_Size 0.0031 0.0034 -0.0036 0.0014 -0.0032 
ROA 0.6437*** 0.6437*** 0.6557*** 0.6699*** 0.6499*** 
Age -0.0277 -0.0270 -0.0203 -0.0257 -0.0193 
Size -0.0693*** -0.0748*** -0.0863*** -0.0804*** -0.0892*** 
Lev 0.9321*** 0.9232*** 0.9129*** 0.9016*** 0.9122*** 
                                                             
2 Stata screenshots of the models can be found in Appendices 6-10 
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Table 5. Ending of the table 
Variable 
Market-to-Bookt 
1 2 3 4 5 
Cons 2.5183*** 2.6478*** 2.9019*** 2.7746*** 2.9397*** 
R2 0.1314 0.1435 0.1907 0.1515 0.1821 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels is indicated by *, **, and *** respectively. 
In the case when performance is measured through the market-based indicator, we can 
make conclusions about the market’s reaction on busyness, but first it is important to mention that 
all models are statistically significant and coefficients in the baseline model for the control 
variables are significant as well. Second and third models consider busyness of inside and outside 
directors (linear and non-linear relationships), while fourth and fifth models allow to see 
relationship in case of the directorships in connected and not connected companies (linear and non-
linear relationships). For the third model when we consider the directorships of the inside and 
outside directorships, we see that there is inverted U-shaped relationship between busyness of 
inside directors and market-to-book ratio. If we calculate the value when market-to-book ratio is 
the highest, we will see that average number of inside directors’ positions is equal to 5.4, meaning 
that market tolerates and reacts positively when number of insiders’ directorships increases to 5, 
but if there are more directorships held by insiders, market’s reaction is negative; this means that 
market considers board to be busy when the average number of the directorships held by inside 
directors is higher than 5. There is no relationship between the number of positions held by outside 
directors.  
At the same time, if we again dive more into the nature of additional directorships, we will 
see (model 5) that there is positive relationship between inside directors’ positions (both in 
connected and not connected companies) and market-to-book ratio. Even though we see non-linear 
relationship, the value where the direction of the relationship changes is in 95% percentile meaning 
that we can consider relationship to be positive and linear. As for outside directors, there is inverted 
U-shaped relationship between the average number of directorships of outside directors in not 
connected companies, and the direction is different when outside director holds more than 2 
positions: after this point market’s reaction is negative. Probably in this case market believes that 
outside directors will not have enough time for proper execution of their duties. Positive 
relationship for the inside directors can be explained through markets perception that if insiders 
are invited to the boards of different companies, it indicates their knowledge, experience and 
reputation. These results are more consistent with the ones received in developing markets, 
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probably indicating that development of the Russian market is not on that high level now and 
social capital of the board members is important for the market. 
Finally, results for the models with agency costs proxies are shown in table 6. 
Table 6 
Results of econometric analysis (3)3 
Variable ATOt SGAt 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Av_Insider2 - 0.0037* - - -0.0008 - 
Av_Insider - -0.0690*** - - 0.0140 - 
Av_Outsider2 - 0.0000 - - -0.0005*** - 
Av_Outsider - -0.0050 - - 0.0172*** - 
Av_Insider_Conn2 - - 0.0020 - - -0.0007 
Av_Insider_Conn - - -0.0454 - - 0.0157 
Av_Insider_Notconn2 - - 0.0352* - - -0.0060 
Av_Insider_Notconn - - -0.1986** - - 0.0116 
Av_Outsider_Conn2 - - -0.0005 - - -0.0004** 
Av_Outsider_Conn - - 0.0126 - - 0.0138** 
Av_Outsider_Notconn2 - - -0.0121 - - 0.0025 
Av_Outsider_Notconn - - -0.0084 - - 0.0112 
Board_Size 0.0439*** 0.0440*** 0.0484*** -0.0119*** -0.0130*** -0.0125*** 
Age 0.1216*** 0.1208*** 0.1217*** -0.0281*** -0.0282*** -0.0293*** 
Size -0.0507*** -0.0345** -0.0333** -0.0081* -0.0146*** -0.0146*** 
Lev 0.2283* 0.2209* 0.2654** -0.1206*** -0.1247*** -0.1344*** 
Cons 1.0152*** 0.6911** 0.6270* 0.5765*** 0.7033*** 0.7054*** 
R2 0.0865 0.1090 0.1350 0.0947 0.1299 0.1348 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels is indicated by *, **, and *** respectively. 
All the presented models are statistically significant. From this table we can also make 
several conclusions about the relationship between agency costs and busyness. First, if to measure 
agency costs as ATO, there is non-linear relationship between average number of insiders positions 
and ATO. However, only less than 5% of insiders hold more than 9 positions (number when 
                                                             
3 Stata screenshots of the models can be found in Appendices 11-16 
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direction changes from negative to positive). This means that there is negative relationship 
between busyness of inside directors and asset turnover. Moreover, the turnover is negative 
between the positions held by insiders in not connected companies. Even though from the table 
we conclude that relationship is non-linear, there is the same situation as before: less than 5% of 
insiders hold more than 3 positions (peak); therefore, relationship is linear and negative. We 
believe that this can be explained through the idea that insiders who are also managers get 
distracted by work in other companies and are not able to make right decisions; as a consequence, 
asset turnover lowers.  
At the same time, if to consider the models where agency costs are measured through 
expense ratio, we can notice that there is non-linear relationship between busyness of outside 
directors and SGA. According to the results from the model 5, when outsiders hold up to 17 
position, relationship is positive and after this point it is negative. From the sample it can be 
observed that less than 5% of outsiders hold more than 17 positions, because of this the relationship 
should be considered as linear and positive. From the 6th model we observe inverted U-shaped 
non-linear relationship between average number of outsiders’ positions in connected companies, 
but because of the same reason as in the cases before we conclude that the relationship is linear 
and positive. Possible explanation for this can be that outside directors getting more and more 
additional directorships become more distracted, and as a result they do not perform monitoring 
function effectively and share of selling, general and administrative expenses rises. 
All in all, it is possible to conclude that there is linear relationship between board busyness 
and agency costs: the busier the board is, the higher the agency costs are. We observed relationship 
between busyness of insiders and asset turnover, and between busyness of outsiders and SGA ratio. 
3.3. Analysis of the results and conclusions 
Summing up the results obtained through the analysis, it is important to state that there are 
different results depending on which metric to use. If to consider operating performance, there is 
negative relationship between busyness of both inside and outside directors. This result is 
consistent with the busyness hypothesis and indicates that when directors have less time to work 
properly, operating performance decreases. Same result was obtained in developed markets that 
also found out that there is negative relationship between operating performance and busyness (e. 
g., Fich, Shivdasani, 2006; Cashman, Gillan, Jun, 2012). Moreover, there is negative relationship 
between average number of the directorships held by insiders in not connected companies and 
performance and also between average number of directorships held by outsiders in connected 
companies. It can be concluded that operating performance is negatively related to the busyness 
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of the directors no matter if they are insiders or outsider, and in case if the company’s target is to 
show high operating performance measured through return on assets, it is better not to have busy 
directors on board. 
On the other hand, there is non-linear relationship between market-to-book ratio and 
busyness. Market reacts positively when insiders hold up to five positions, and in case if number 
of positions is higher than 5, relationship changes to negative. If to have a look at distribution of 
the directorships in connected and not connected companies, there is positive relation between 
market performance and appointments of insiders and for the outsiders there is also positive 
relation up to 2 additional appointments in not connected companies. In general, we see that in 
case of market’s reaction, results are more consistent with developing markets where positive 
reaction is more common (Sarkar, Sarkar, 2009). This can indicate the level of the development 
of Russian market and investors perception that social capital in terms of networks and ties is more 
important. 
As for the agency costs, we see that there is linear negative relationship between average 
number of directorships and level of agency costs. Unfortunately, this result is impossible to 
compare with the results from other studies, but the nature of relationship was expected. When 
directors become too busy, they are not able to effectively monitor managers and advise them. At 
the same time, it is important to mention that the relationship between agency costs and busyness 
should be studied more in order to make proper conclusions as there can be many firm-specific 
factors connected to the chosen indicators that do not really reflect the level of agency costs. 
3.4. Managerial implications 
Conducted study shows that relationship between busyness and financial performance is 
different depending on how the performance is measured; at the same time, busyness is proved to 
be positively associated with agency costs: the busier the directors are, the higher the level of the 
agency costs in the company is. 
Obtained results allow to make several recommendations for different players in the 
companies and in the market aimed at improving the performance of the companies. 
1) Shareholders 
To start with, shareholders can obtain many useful insights for appointments of the 
directors for the board. First of all, if shareholders are more interested in the operating performance 
of the company, it is better to appoint directors without additional appointments in other 
companies. This will let them to concentrate solely on the company’s activities. Moreover, 
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directors without additional directorships proved to be more efficient in performing their 
monitoring function and lowering agency costs. On the other hand, if the shareholders are currently 
more concerned about the performance on the stock exchange, it is good to have busy directors, 
as busy directors are giving positive signals to the market. However, it is reasonable to have upper 
limits of the positions held by inside directors and by outside directors in, especially, not connected 
companies. Even if in the coming years there will not appear official recommendation about the 
number of directorships in the corporate governance code, it is advised to set these limits in 
company documents and follow them while appointing new directors. 
2) Managers 
For managers who serve on boards it is important to know that their additional 
appointments are perceived positively by the market but can have bad influence on the operating 
performance. Market believes that if insider is appointed to the boards of any company (connected 
or not connected), this indicates his or her reputation and proves good quality of his or her job. 
3) Investors 
 For investors proved relationships should help to realize that before choosing the 
companies, corporate governance should be studied as well. Usually corporate governance is 
observed through the concept of independent directors and gender diversity, but as was shown, 
busyness is also important and can be determinant to company performance. In addition, it is 
reasonable to see the busyness from the perspective of outside and inside directors, and also 
understand that the nature (connected companies or not) of the directorships matters. 
4) Regulation authorities 
Because of the negative relationship between the operating performance and busyness, and 
also different direction of the relationship between market performance and busyness depending 
on the number of positions held, it is reasonable to suggest recommendations related to the 
busyness in the corporate governance code. Moreover, this is also reasonable because of the 
negative effect of busyness on the level of agency costs. Recommendations can be expressed in 
the form of limit for the additional directorships.  
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CONCLUSION 
As was already mentioned, companies right now have way bigger value compared to the 
value of their tangible assets, and this leads to the conclusion that there is something else inside 
the companies that generates value. One of the possible sources can be intellectual capital, 
however, there are different groups of stakeholders that can be viewed as sources of intellectual 
capital. 
Within this master thesis board of directors was chosen as the source of intellectual capital, 
and it is believed that there are two types of intellectual capital board of directors provide 
companies with: human capital and social capital. Human capital implies knowledge, experience 
and skills that belong to board members, whereas social capital is about the networks and 
connections. Concept of multiple directorships is usually viewed from the perspective of social 
capital; however, the division is very relative. On the one hand, busy directors (those who hold 
additional directorships in the boards of other companies) have variety of experience, much 
knowledge and amazing skills, besides they have many connections and access to many resources; 
on the other hand, in case of holding too many positions, such directors might not be able to 
perform their duties well because of the lack of time. Advantages of busyness can be expressed as 
reputation hypothesis, quality hypothesis and resource dependence theory (Fama, Jensen, 1983; 
Fama, 1980; Pfeffer, 1972), while negative side is reflected within busyness hypothesis (Ferris et 
al., 2003). 
Because of the ambiguity of the concept, the following question raise: is there relationship 
between board busyness and company performance? The goal of the thesis was to answer this 
question and based on the obtained results come up with managerial implications. As there is 
limited amount of the studies of Russian market, Russian public companies were chosen for the 
analysis.  
First chapter of this work contains description of the boards of directors, their importance, 
roles and functions. Moreover, intellectual capital of the board of directors is discussed and it is 
shown that there is impact of the board composition and intellectual capital on company 
performance. Second chapter is more focused on the company performance and allows to see that 
there are at least two approaches to treat company performance: from the perspective of financial 
performance and from the perspective of agency costs. Different metrics for financial performance 
and agency costs are discussed in order to choose the most appropriate ones for the research. Third 
chapter contains empirical study conducted on the sample of 219 Russian companies within the 
period of 2015-2016. 3672 directors are studied and analyzed in terms of board characteristics. 
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The study shows that there is negative relationship between board busyness and financial 
operating performance, non-linear relationship between busyness and market performance, and 
positive relationship between board busyness and the level of agency costs, and such results allow 
to come up with specific managerial implications. Moreover, results show, that it is important to 
consider multiple directorships not for all the directors, but it is better to distinguish between 
outside and inside directors, and also to study the nature of the directorships held, in other words, 
if these directorships are held in connected or not connected companies. Saying that, if the 
performance is measured as return on assets, there is negative relationship between ROA and both 
busyness of outsiders and insiders. Every additional directorship is associated with the decrease in 
the return on assets. If financial performance is measured as M/B ratio, there is inverted U-shaped 
relationship with busyness of insiders: if insiders hold less than 5 positions, relationship is positive, 
and if average number of the positions is higher, relationship is negative. Besides, for the outsiders 
there was found non-linear relationship between the average number of the positions in not 
connected companies and M/B ratio. Finally, as for the agency costs, linear relationship takes 
place: asset turnover is negatively associated with the busyness of insiders, while share of SGA 
expenses is positive associated with the busyness of outsiders. Such results indicate that busyness 
of the board members is related to the results of the companies and should be taken into account 
while observing companies’ performance. 
The paper contributes to the research of the board busyness in Russian companies and 
provides with first insights into relation between the agency costs and board busyness. As for 
implications, obtained results can be useful for the investors, as they can choose stocks for 
investments not only based on the financial analysis, but also on the corporate governance analysis. 
In addition, results should be useful for the shareholders especially in the situations of making 
decisions about the board composition or appointment of new members. Another important 
stakeholder are regulatory authorities, and in this case the results can become base for the 
recommendation to include suggections in the corporate governance code on the limit of multiple 
directorships number. 
However, along with stated implications it is necessary to realize that there are some 
limitations of the study. First of all, studied period is relatively small, but as was explained in the 
paper, this period was chosen because of publication of new edition of corporate governance code 
in 2014. As time will pass, it is necessary to consider longer time period. Secondly, it is impossible 
to state that director’s attitude to the busyness and to additional directorships is the same: some 
directors can really get benefits for the company through the networks, knowledge and experience, 
whereas others can ignore the opportunities and just hold the positions without much of 
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involvement. It was tried to tackle this problem at least through viewing separately positions in 
connected and not connected companies, however, still the limitation exists. Thirdly, nature of the 
companies where these directorships are held can also influence the effect on the company 
performance, and in current study such characteristics were not considered.  
To conclude, the goal of the master thesis was reached and the empirical study of the 
relationship between busyness of the boards of directors in the Russian companies and their 
performance was conducted. Obtained results and provided implications can be useful and 
interesting for the shareholders, potential investors, managers and regulatory authorities. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1. Screenshot from Stata of the baseline model with ROA as dependent variable 
 
Appendix 2. Screenshot from Stata of the linear regression model with ROA as dependent variable 
and busyness of insiders and outsiders as independent variables 
 
Appendix 3. Screenshot from Stata of the non-linear regression model with ROA as dependent 
variable and busyness of insiders and outsiders as independent variables 
 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons    -.1450097   .0590764    -2.45   0.015    -.2611384    -.028881
        lev1    -.0576911   .0230819    -2.50   0.013     -.103064   -.0123182
    lnassets     .0099758   .0026867     3.71   0.000     .0046945    .0152571
       lnage     .0121491   .0050977     2.38   0.018     .0021284    .0221699
       bsize    -.0062405   .0024577    -2.54   0.011    -.0110717   -.0014094
                                                                              
         roa        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    4.69700634   416  .011290881           Root MSE      =   .1042
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0383
    Residual     4.4736397   412  .010858349           R-squared     =  0.0476
       Model    .223366643     4  .055841661           Prob > F      =  0.0005
                                                       F(  4,   412) =    5.14
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     417
. reg roa bsize lnage lnassets lev1
                                                                              
       _cons    -.1792764   .0612917    -2.92   0.004    -.2997616   -.0587913
        lev1    -.0586391   .0230277    -2.55   0.011    -.1039061   -.0133722
    lnassets     .0117655   .0028192     4.17   0.000     .0062236    .0173074
       lnage     .0123179    .005088     2.42   0.016      .002316    .0223197
       bsize    -.0064922   .0024548    -2.64   0.008    -.0113177   -.0016667
      av_out    -.0011385   .0014859    -0.77   0.444    -.0040594    .0017824
      av_ins    -.0037849    .002217    -1.71   0.089    -.0081429    .0005732
                                                                              
         roa        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    4.69700634   416  .011290881           Root MSE      =  .10393
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0434
    Residual    4.42856626   410  .010801381           R-squared     =  0.0572
       Model    .268440077     6  .044740013           Prob > F      =  0.0005
                                                       F(  6,   410) =    4.14
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     417
. reg roa av_ins av_out bsize lnage lnassets lev1
                                                                              
       _cons     -.212311   .0624035    -3.40   0.001    -.3349836   -.0896384
        lev1    -.0563326    .022898    -2.46   0.014    -.1013453   -.0113199
    lnassets     .0134555   .0028818     4.67   0.000     .0077905    .0191204
       lnage     .0120826   .0050584     2.39   0.017     .0021388    .0220263
       bsize    -.0059695    .002447    -2.44   0.015    -.0107798   -.0011592
      av_out     -.007028    .002846    -2.47   0.014    -.0126227   -.0014333
     av_out2     .0002408   .0001028     2.34   0.020     .0000387    .0004429
      av_ins     -.008693   .0048666    -1.79   0.075    -.0182598    .0008738
     av_ins2     .0004829   .0003853     1.25   0.211    -.0002745    .0012402
                                                                              
         roa        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    4.69700634   416  .011290881           Root MSE      =  .10327
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0555
    Residual    4.35102172   408  .010664269           R-squared     =  0.0737
       Model    .345984617     8  .043248077           Prob > F      =  0.0001
                                                       F(  8,   408) =    4.06
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     417
. reg roa av_ins2 av_ins av_out2 av_out bsize lnage lnassets lev1
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Appendix 4. Screenshot from Stata of the linear regression model with ROA as dependent variable 
and busyness of insiders and outsiders (with division into connected and not connected companies) 
as independent variables 
 
Appendix 5. Screenshot from Stata of the non-linear regression model with ROA as dependent 
variable and busyness of insiders and outsiders (with division into connected and not connected 
companies) as independent variables 
 
Appendix 6. Screenshot from Stata of the baseline model with M/B ratio as dependent variable 
 
                                                                              
       _cons    -.1848815   .0623869    -2.96   0.003    -.3075214   -.0622416
        lev1    -.0589924   .0231394    -2.55   0.011    -.1044797   -.0135052
    lnassets     .0118027   .0028626     4.12   0.000     .0061755      .01743
       lnage     .0119809   .0050584     2.37   0.018     .0020371    .0219247
       bsize    -.0055388   .0024725    -2.24   0.026    -.0103992   -.0006784
av_out_nos~s    -.0017556   .0045526    -0.39   0.700     -.010705    .0071938
 av_out_subs    -.0012366   .0014993    -0.82   0.410     -.004184    .0017107
av_ins_nos~s    -.0229009   .0075034    -3.05   0.002     -.037651   -.0081508
 av_ins_subs    -.0006592   .0024831    -0.27   0.791    -.0055404    .0042221
                                                                              
         roa        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    4.69700634   416  .011290881           Root MSE      =  .10322
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0564
    Residual    4.34705412   408  .010654544           R-squared     =  0.0745
       Model    .349952214     8  .043744027           Prob > F      =  0.0001
                                                       F(  8,   408) =    4.11
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     417
. reg roa av_ins_subs av_ins_nosubs av_out_subs av_out_nosubs bsize lnage lnassets lev1
                                                                              
       _cons    -.1948101   .0633408    -3.08   0.002    -.3193288   -.0702914
        lev1    -.0589109   .0229591    -2.57   0.011     -.104045   -.0137768
    lnassets     .0124081   .0029361     4.23   0.000     .0066361    .0181802
       lnage     .0116175   .0050478     2.30   0.022     .0016942    .0215407
       bsize    -.0054023   .0024567    -2.20   0.028    -.0102319   -.0005728
av_out_nos~s     -.000845   .0114589    -0.07   0.941    -.0233716    .0216815
av_out_nos~2     -.000483   .0023543    -0.21   0.838    -.0051112    .0041451
 av_out_subs    -.0064951   .0029795    -2.18   0.030    -.0123523   -.0006379
av_out_subs2     .0002262   .0001051     2.15   0.032     .0000196    .0004329
av_ins_nos~s     .0112181   .0167655     0.67   0.504    -.0217405    .0441767
av_ins_nos~2    -.0080257    .003666    -2.19   0.029    -.0152326   -.0008188
 av_ins_subs    -.0055394   .0053517    -1.04   0.301      -.01606    .0049813
av_ins_subs2     .0004063   .0004132     0.98   0.326    -.0004061    .0012187
                                                                              
         roa        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    4.69700634   416  .011290881           Root MSE      =  .10228
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0736
    Residual    4.22598403   404  .010460357           R-squared     =  0.1003
       Model     .47102231    12  .039251859           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 12,   404) =    3.75
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     417
> subs bsize lnage lnassets lev1
. reg roa av_ins_subs2 av_ins_subs av_ins_nosubs2 av_ins_nosubs av_out_subs2 av_out_subs av_out_nosubs2 av_out_no
                                                                              
       _cons     2.518323   .3532276     7.13   0.000     1.823634    3.213012
        lev1     .9321591   .1559849     5.98   0.000     .6253855    1.238933
    lnassets    -.0693198   .0166081    -4.17   0.000    -.1019828   -.0366569
       lnage    -.0276884   .0283954    -0.98   0.330    -.0835333    .0281565
         roa     .6436797   .1521458     4.23   0.000     .3444563    .9429031
       bsize     .0031357   .0139035     0.23   0.822    -.0242082    .0304795
                                                                              
        mtob        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    114.112392   359  .317861817           Root MSE      =  .52914
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1191
    Residual    99.1164537   354  .279989982           R-squared     =  0.1314
       Model    14.9959385     5  2.99918771           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  5,   354) =   10.71
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     360
. reg mtob bsize roa lnage lnassets lev1
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Appendix 7. Screenshot from Stata of the linear regression model with M/B ratio as dependent 
variable and busyness of insiders and outsiders as independent variables 
 
Appendix 8. Screenshot from Stata of the non-linear regression model with M/B ratio as dependent 
variable and busyness of insiders and outsiders as independent variables 
 
Appendix 9. Screenshot from Stata of the linear regression model with M/B ratio as dependent 
variable and busyness of insiders and outsiders (with division into connected and not connected 
companies) as independent variables 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     2.647781   .3650148     7.25   0.000     1.929897    3.365665
        lev1     .9232488   .1554648     5.94   0.000     .6174922    1.229005
    lnassets    -.0747656   .0171586    -4.36   0.000    -.1085119   -.0410194
       lnage    -.0269981   .0283549    -0.95   0.342    -.0827645    .0287682
         roa      .643665    .151681     4.24   0.000     .3453501      .94198
       bsize     .0034189   .0138467     0.25   0.805    -.0238138    .0306516
      av_out    -.0113275   .0082423    -1.37   0.170    -.0275379    .0048829
      av_ins      .024528   .0131639     1.86   0.063    -.0013618    .0504178
                                                                              
        mtob        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    114.112392   359  .317861817           Root MSE      =  .52694
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1265
    Residual    97.7386809   352  .277666707           R-squared     =  0.1435
       Model    16.3737114     7  2.33910163           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  7,   352) =    8.42
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     360
. reg mtob av_ins av_out bsize roa lnage lnassets lev1
                                                                              
       _cons     2.901932   .3609832     8.04   0.000     2.191963    3.611901
        lev1     .9129104   .1516807     6.02   0.000     .6145902    1.211231
    lnassets    -.0862777   .0169521    -5.09   0.000    -.1196184   -.0529369
       lnage    -.0202549   .0277531    -0.73   0.466    -.0748387    .0343289
         roa     .6556822    .148303     4.42   0.000      .364005    .9473594
       bsize    -.0036417   .0136326    -0.27   0.790    -.0304537    .0231704
      av_out     .0037578   .0160667     0.23   0.815    -.0278417    .0353573
     av_out2     -.000718   .0005471    -1.31   0.190    -.0017941    .0003581
      av_ins     .1514003   .0326906     4.63   0.000     .0871056    .2156951
     av_ins2    -.0140608   .0032806    -4.29   0.000     -.020513   -.0076086
                                                                              
        mtob        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    114.112392   359  .317861817           Root MSE      =  .51368
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1699
    Residual    92.3548563   350  .263871018           R-squared     =  0.1907
       Model     21.757536     9    2.417504           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  9,   350) =    9.16
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     360
. reg mtob av_ins2 av_ins av_out2 av_out bsize roa lnage lnassets lev1
                                                                              
       _cons     2.774553   .3741641     7.42   0.000      2.03866    3.510446
        lev1     .9015523   .1572698     5.73   0.000     .5922396    1.210865
    lnassets    -.0804304   .0175754    -4.58   0.000    -.1149971   -.0458637
       lnage    -.0257244   .0283487    -0.91   0.365    -.0814796    .0300308
         roa     .6698934   .1522209     4.40   0.000     .3705107    .9692761
       bsize     .0013914   .0139115     0.10   0.920    -.0259693     .028752
av_out_nos~s     .0261952   .0266125     0.98   0.326    -.0261454    .0785358
 av_out_subs    -.0137798   .0083458    -1.65   0.100     -.030194    .0026343
av_ins_nos~s     .0492776   .0407715     1.21   0.228    -.0309102    .1294655
 av_ins_subs     .0151257   .0159994     0.95   0.345    -.0163412    .0465927
                                                                              
        mtob        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    114.112392   359  .317861817           Root MSE      =  .52596
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1297
    Residual     96.823014   350  .276637183           R-squared     =  0.1515
       Model    17.2893783     9  1.92104203           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  9,   350) =    6.94
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     360
. reg mtob av_ins_subs av_ins_nosubs av_out_subs av_out_nosubs bsize roa lnage lnassets lev1
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Appendix 10. Screenshot from Stata of the non-linear regression model with M/B ratio as 
dependent variable and busyness of insiders and outsiders (with division into connected and not 
connected companies) as independent variables 
 
Appendix 11. Screenshot from Stata of the baseline model with ATO as dependent variable 
 
Appendix 12. Screenshot from Stata of the non-linear regression model with ATO as dependent 
variable and busyness of insiders and outsiders as independent variables 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     2.939747   .3749434     7.84   0.000     2.202292    3.677202
        lev1     .9122994   .1553459     5.87   0.000     .6067583     1.21784
    lnassets    -.0891797   .0177648    -5.02   0.000    -.1241204    -.054239
       lnage    -.0193166    .028392    -0.68   0.497    -.0751592    .0365261
         roa     .6498679   .1510745     4.30   0.000     .3527281    .9470078
       bsize    -.0032096   .0138591    -0.23   0.817    -.0304683    .0240492
av_out_nos~s     .1229638   .0674202     1.82   0.069    -.0096413    .2555688
av_out_nos~2    -.0246073   .0143616    -1.71   0.088    -.0528543    .0036398
 av_out_subs     .0027399   .0170417     0.16   0.872    -.0307786    .0362583
av_out_subs2    -.0005824   .0005719    -1.02   0.309    -.0017072    .0005424
av_ins_nos~s     .1662628   .0944473     1.76   0.079    -.0195002    .3520258
av_ins_nos~2    -.0319616   .0200617    -1.59   0.112    -.0714197    .0074966
 av_ins_subs     .0877265   .0412671     2.13   0.034     .0065604    .1688925
av_ins_subs2    -.0096032   .0044303    -2.17   0.031    -.0183169   -.0008895
                                                                              
        mtob        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    114.112392   359  .317861817           Root MSE      =  .51937
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1514
    Residual    93.3328535   346  .269748132           R-squared     =  0.1821
       Model    20.7795387    13  1.59842606           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 13,   346) =    5.93
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     360
> osubs bsize roa lnage lnassets lev1
. reg mtob av_ins_subs2 av_ins_subs av_ins_nosubs2 av_ins_nosubs av_out_subs2 av_out_subs av_out_nosubs2 av_out_n
                                                                              
       _cons     1.015236   .3323176     3.06   0.002     .3618617     1.66861
        lev1     .2282821   .1264543     1.81   0.072    -.0203412    .4769055
    lnassets    -.0506689   .0148458    -3.41   0.001    -.0798574   -.0214805
       lnage     .1215924    .028669     4.24   0.000     .0652258    .1779589
       bsize     .0438713   .0133543     3.29   0.001     .0176151    .0701274
                                                                              
         ato        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    135.503148   391  .346555366           Root MSE      =  .56556
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0770
    Residual    123.783487   387  .319853972           R-squared     =  0.0865
       Model    11.7196607     4  2.92991519           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  4,   387) =    9.16
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     392
. reg ato bsize lnage lnassets lev1
                                                                              
       _cons     .6910627   .3517758     1.96   0.050    -.0005909    1.382716
        lev1      .220852   .1258796     1.75   0.080    -.0266497    .4683537
    lnassets    -.0345245   .0159895    -2.16   0.031    -.0659626   -.0030864
       lnage     .1208469   .0285154     4.24   0.000     .0647807    .1769132
       bsize     .0440471   .0133169     3.31   0.001     .0178637    .0702305
      av_out    -.0050311   .0167899    -0.30   0.765     -.038043    .0279807
     av_out2     .0000361   .0005869     0.06   0.951    -.0011177      .00119
      av_ins    -.0689795   .0260286    -2.65   0.008    -.1201563   -.0178027
     av_ins2     .0036912   .0020783     1.78   0.077    -.0003951    .0077776
                                                                              
         ato        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    135.503148   391  .346555366           Root MSE      =  .56145
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0904
    Residual    120.729493   383  .315220609           R-squared     =  0.1090
       Model    14.7736548     8  1.84670685           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  8,   383) =    5.86
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     392
. reg ato av_ins2 av_ins av_out2 av_out bsize lnage lnassets lev1
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Appendix 13. Screenshot from Stata of the non-linear regression model with ATO as dependent 
variable and busyness of insiders and outsiders (with division into connected and not connected 
companies) as independent variables 
 
Appendix 14. Screenshot from Stata of the baseline model with SGA ratio as dependent variable 
 
Appendix 15. Screenshot from Stata of the non-linear regression model with SGA ratio as 
dependent variable and busyness of insiders and outsiders as independent variables 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .6270154   .3554879     1.76   0.079    -.0719603    1.325991
        lev1     .2654297   .1258003     2.11   0.036     .0180758    .5127837
    lnassets    -.0333127   .0162683    -2.05   0.041    -.0653002   -.0013253
       lnage     .1217434   .0285531     4.26   0.000     .0656011    .1778857
       bsize     .0484407   .0133923     3.62   0.000     .0221081    .0747733
av_out_nos~s    -.0083626   .0631928    -0.13   0.895     -.132615    .1158898
av_out_nos~2    -.0120753   .0129406    -0.93   0.351    -.0375196     .013369
 av_out_subs      .012553   .0178633     0.70   0.483    -.0225706    .0476766
av_out_subs2    -.0004834   .0006077    -0.80   0.427    -.0016782    .0007114
av_ins_nos~s      -.19861   .0901251    -2.20   0.028     -.375818   -.0214021
av_ins_nos~2     .0352262   .0198053     1.78   0.076    -.0037159    .0741682
 av_ins_subs    -.0454032   .0284128    -1.60   0.111    -.1012696    .0104633
av_ins_subs2     .0020068   .0022278     0.90   0.368    -.0023736    .0063872
                                                                              
         ato        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    135.503148   391  .346555366           Root MSE      =  .55611
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1076
    Residual    117.210844   379   .30926344           R-squared     =  0.1350
       Model    18.2923041    12  1.52435868           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 12,   379) =    4.93
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     392
> subs bsize lnage lnassets lev1
. reg ato av_ins_subs2 av_ins_subs av_ins_nosubs2 av_ins_nosubs av_out_subs2 av_out_subs av_out_nosubs2 av_out_no
                                                                              
       _cons     .5765325   .1086566     5.31   0.000     .3629312    .7901339
        lev1    -.1206209   .0421262    -2.86   0.004    -.2034342   -.0378076
    lnassets    -.0081018    .005006    -1.62   0.106    -.0179427    .0017392
       lnage     -.028125   .0093071    -3.02   0.003    -.0464213   -.0098288
       bsize    -.0118936   .0044958    -2.65   0.008    -.0207316   -.0030556
                                                                              
         sga        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    15.6128642   409  .038173262           Root MSE      =  .18682
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0857
    Residual    14.1349078   405  .034901007           R-squared     =  0.0947
       Model    1.47795634     4  .369489086           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  4,   405) =   10.59
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     410
. reg sga bsize lnage lnassets lev1
                                                                              
       _cons     .7033259   .1134091     6.20   0.000     .4803753    .9262766
        lev1    -.1247109   .0415606    -3.00   0.003    -.2064147    -.043007
    lnassets    -.0146443   .0052639    -2.78   0.006    -.0249926   -.0042959
       lnage    -.0281866   .0091806    -3.07   0.002    -.0462347   -.0101384
       bsize    -.0130509   .0044596    -2.93   0.004    -.0218181   -.0042838
      av_out     .0172098   .0050755     3.39   0.001      .007232    .0271876
     av_out2    -.0005297   .0001834    -2.89   0.004    -.0008903   -.0001691
      av_ins     .0140392   .0088928     1.58   0.115    -.0034432    .0315216
     av_ins2    -.0007939   .0006992    -1.14   0.257    -.0021684    .0005807
                                                                              
         sga        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    15.6128642   409  .038173262           Root MSE      =  .18405
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1126
    Residual    13.5839953   401    .0338753           R-squared     =  0.1299
       Model    2.02886882     8  .253608603           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  8,   401) =    7.49
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     410
. reg sga av_ins2 av_ins av_out2 av_out bsize lnage lnassets lev1
75 
 
Appendix 16. Screenshot from Stata of the non-linear regression model with SGA ratio as 
dependent variable and busyness of insiders and outsiders (with division into connected and not 
connected companies) as independent variables 
                                                                               
       _cons     .7053719   .1166589     6.05   0.000     .4760255    .9347183
        lev1    -.1344392    .042205    -3.19   0.002    -.2174125    -.051466
    lnassets    -.0146005   .0054408    -2.68   0.008    -.0252969   -.0039042
       lnage    -.0293659   .0092572    -3.17   0.002    -.0475651   -.0111667
       bsize    -.0124501   .0045053    -2.76   0.006    -.0213074   -.0035928
av_out_nos~s      .011182    .020859     0.54   0.592    -.0298259    .0521898
av_out_nos~2     .0024791   .0042796     0.58   0.563    -.0059345    .0108926
 av_out_subs     .0137978   .0053908     2.56   0.011     .0031998    .0243959
av_out_subs2    -.0004241   .0001902    -2.23   0.026     -.000798   -.0000501
av_ins_nos~s     .0115757   .0309198     0.37   0.708    -.0492113    .0723627
av_ins_nos~2    -.0060246   .0066809    -0.90   0.368    -.0191589    .0071098
 av_ins_subs     .0156522   .0099605     1.57   0.117    -.0039298    .0352341
av_ins_subs2    -.0007089    .000762    -0.93   0.353    -.0022069    .0007891
                                                                              
         sga        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    15.6128642   409  .038173262           Root MSE      =  .18446
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1086
    Residual    13.5087306   397  .034027029           R-squared     =  0.1348
       Model    2.10413359    12  .175344466           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 12,   397) =    5.15
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     410
> subs bsize lnage lnassets lev1
. reg sga av_ins_subs2 av_ins_subs av_ins_nosubs2 av_ins_nosubs av_out_subs2 av_out_subs av_out_nosubs2 av_out_no
